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This thesis explores the emergence of pro-government militias (PGMs) within the context of the post-
2011 intrastate conflict in Syria. It investigates the factors that contributed to the breakdown of Syria’s 
armed forces during their counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. By inquiring into the mechanisms 
that drove the unravelling of Syria’s coercive machinery, this thesis sheds light on why the regime of 
Syrian president Bashar al-Assad specifically resorted to leveraging irregular forces to which security 
functions conventionally reserved for the state were outsourced. As such, this thesis asks the 
following research question: What are the drivers underpinning the employment of PGMs in the post-
2011 Syrian conflict?  
This thesis progresses in four main parts. First, it introduces the purpose, relevance, and 
methodology of the research, followed by a literature review that engages with the scholarly work 
surrounding the use of PGMs in COIN settings. Second, it highlights how Syrian President Bashar 
al-Assad coup-proofed his coercive forces, prioritizing coup risk mitigation over military 
effectiveness. The subordination of the coercive institutions in accordance with strategies deliberately 
intended to divide them resulted in a dysfunctional security sector that third, was incapable of 
cohesively performing combatively and withstanding the advances of insurgents once the uprising 
had militarized. Fourth, it demonstrates that as the Syrian regime became more insecure, it outsourced 
greater functions to PGMs in order to compensate for the depletion of the state’s official armed and 
security forces. This thesis ultimately argues that a vicious cycle between coup-proofing and regime 
insecurity created a feedback loop that motivated the Syrian regime to resort to incorporating PGMs 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
 
This chapter introduces the research inquiry posed by the thesis. It begins by providing a brief 
overview of the backdrop against which the research question exists. After addressing the political 
and security climate in which PGMs emerged in Syria, it outlines the objective of the study and 
provides an abridged summary of the argument. This chapter proceeds to explain the methodology 
applied in order to develop a framework that provides a sufficiently satisfactory answer to the research 
question. This includes defining its main terms in addition to the timeline of the study and an 
acknowledgement of its methodological limitations. The chapter then concludes with an articulation 
of the relevance of the research, which situates the study of PGMs into academic currents that 
emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War.  
BACKGROUND 
In 2011, widespread protests swept the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The responses of 
regimes across the MENA region ranged on a continuum from the promise of reform to a recourse to 
extreme repression, with some states oscillating between the two or conducting them simultaneously. 
After the ouster of Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi, the authoritarian regime of Syrian President 
Bashar al-Assad became unrivalled in its utilization of extreme force in quelling the popular uprisings.  
 Often referred to as the “Arab Spring,”1 the transnational protest movement engulfing the 
region began galvanizing the Syrian street in early 2011. However, the country’s largely civic 
uprising had evolved into an armed revolt within months owing to the heavy-handed response of the 
military and security apparatus.2 By 2012, an organized armed rebellion had territorially crystalized 




By 2013, it had become apparent that the Syria was were mired in a deepening intrastate 
conflict. In the wake of the collapse of Syrian military defences across the country and the robust 
reliance on PGMs in responding to insurgent advances, two things had become resoundingly 
apparent. First, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) had suffered substantial decay over the course of the 
first two years of conflict. Second, the mobilization of PGMs had become an undeniable feature of 
the state’s security landscape. Providing an explanation that accounts for these interconnected 
developments constitutes the basis of this thesis’ research inquiry. 
PURPOSE 
The research question this thesis addresses is: what are the drivers underpinning the employment of 
PGMs in the post-2011 Syrian conflict? As such, it aims to draw on the dynamics present in the 
conflict to illustrate why, when faced with significant challenges to their rule, the political and 
military leaders of the Syrian regime either mobilized, or authorized the utilization of, PGMs. To 
sharpen its focus, this project’s investigation is guided by the following subset of questions: Why did 
Assad resort to using PGMs to carry out functions conventionally executed by the armed and security 
forces of the state? What type of conditions existed in order to create a security context conducive of 
such outsourcing? What are the benefits associated with the decision to subcontract security 
operations in Syria to irregular coercive actors outside the direct control of the institutions of the 
state? 
While there exists a growing body of literature on Syria that alludes to the utilization of PGMs 
during wartime, very few texts thoroughly examine the role of institutional factors in helping to drive 
this outsourcing process. Put differently, an analysis of the specific mechanisms that explain why the 
politicization of a state’s coercive forces impacted their institutional decay during the conflict has 
rarely been combined with a comprehensive look at how such forces disintegrated and at what 
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particular junctures PGM outsourcing occurred. Combining both the why and the how (so to speak) 
constitutes the rationale behind this research inquiry.  
ARGUMENT AND SCOPE OF STUDY 
This thesis argues that in the post-2011 Syrian conflict, PGMs emerged as a result of a vicious cycle 
in which coup-proofing and regime insecurity reinforced one another. Specifically, the case of Syria 
demonstrates that as regime security dwindled, Assad, who presided over a coup-proofed security 
infrastructure, was impelled to delegate a host of security operations to PGMs in an attempt to 
reinforce his regime’s eroding coercive capacity and break the detrimental feedback loop that 
hindered their COIN campaigns.  
The argument advanced in this thesis progresses in three main parts. First, it illustrates how 
Assad heavily coup-proofed his armed and security forces, prioritizing the mitigation of palace coups 
over generating effective personnel. The president’s coup-proofing system, inherited from his father, 
Hafez, leveraged counterbalancing and the overreliance on ethnosectarian and familial bonds as tools 
intended to structurally divide his coercive forces. Moreover, he allowed corruption to thrive within 
his coercive institutions, enabling illicit avenues for self-enrichment in order to secure the allegiance 
of the officer corps. Together, these dynamics broadly fashioned dysfunctional forces with low 
operational capacity. Second, it elucidates that role that each of these tools played in contributing to 
the decomposition of the SAA during the Syrian conflict, undermining its ability to withstand and 
repel the advances of insurgents, in spite of its military superiority on paper. This led to a vicious 
cycle in which coup-proofing and regime insecurity reinforced one another, perpetuating a 
detrimental feedback loop that further impeded the regime’s COIN efforts. Third, it maps the link 
between regime insecurity and the reliance on PGMs, demonstrating that as Assad became more 
insecure, his regime’s incorporation of PGMs deepened. As head of state, he progressively outsourced 
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greater functions to exogenous security actors as his coercive forces eroded under the stress of 
combat.  
The timeline under consideration for this thesis is from 2011-2019. Whereas Syria saw 
varying degrees of clandestine PGM mobilization after 2011, the formalization of PGMs as state-
aligned actors officially materialized in early 2013. Using this timeline, this thesis draws on the 
dynamics present in the Syrian conflict to illustrate that as regime insecurity soared, the outsourcing 
of security operations to PGMs increased. When faced with significant challenges to their rule, the 
political and security elite in Syria undertook concerted efforts to preserve their power by 
paradoxically relinquishing one of the state’s key functions – its role as the sole authoritative entity 
responsible for the enforcement of coercion, otherwise commonly known as the “monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force.”3  
Here, a note is due on the application of a counterfactual. While some PGMs may have 
organically emerged due to the security vacuum that arose during the war, two points are worth 
addressing. First, there is the matter of causality. The argument laid out in this thesis draws on the 
feedback loop between coup-proofing and regime insecurity as a causal mechanism that helped lay 
the groundwork for the disintegration of the coercive forces, and, by extension, the fragmented 
security context in which the proliferation of PGMs occurred. Second, even among actors who may 
have initially organized militias independent of the state, the role of the regime in providing support 
– whether through arms, training, financing, security coordination, and/or legal authorization – ipso 
facto showcases its acceptance of this security configuration, as it nevertheless served its COIN 
efforts. This sequence of events is explored further in Chapter 4. 
This thesis acknowledges that in Syria, political decisions made by the Assad regime fuelled 
the insurgency by alienating broad segments of the population. However, it examines the security 
vacuum largely through the lens of the feedback loop that unfolded between coup-proofing and 
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regime insecurity. Said differently, although this thesis recognizes that elements beyond this feedback 
loop contributed to the fragmented security context in which PGMs proliferated, it explores their 
emergence in relation to this dynamic. For example, while a combination of poverty, sectarian 
discrimination, and state repression inspired resistance from overwhelmingly Sunni movements 
within the Syrian street, this thesis generally examines such grievances insofar as they affect security 
actors who are part of the state’s coercive forces. A comprehensive account of how Sunni grievances 
sustained the insurgency in Syria is simply outside of the scope of this thesis. 
This thesis excludes from its focus the Kurdish-dominated People’s Protection Units (YPG) 
in Syria, as its relationship with the central government and its leadership does not fit the purpose of 
the study. Although the group is alluded to, it is passively examined within the context of its role as 
a contentious non-state actor that rivals the authority of Damascus – not as a PGM.  
CLARIFYING TERMS: 
For regime insecurity, this thesis formulates a working concept that borrows from Brian Job4 and 
Richard Jackson.5 It defines regime insecurity as the condition where governing elites, those 
representing the highest echelons of the political and coercive machinery of the officially recognized 
government, are vulnerable to violent contestation to their rule. Although regimes tend to refer to the 
institutional character of the state and its system of governance, the case in question is marked by a 
high degree of personalistic leadership.   
While the author recognizes that regimes, governments, and states are not by definition 
interchangeable, in authoritarian systems the demarcation line is often muddled. This is particularly 
true for regimes that can be defined as patrimonial or sultanistic. Given the nature of their political 
configurations, a great degree of embeddedness in one another complicates the ability to definitively 
delineate their margins, making it a matter of philosophical contention. This point is succinctly 
articulated by Jeff Goodwin: 
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The distinction between state and [political] regime can become quite blurred in the 
real world. This happens the more that states and regimes interpenetrate one 
another, as when the armed forces (a key component of the state) directly wield 
executive power, or when a one-party regime penetrates key state organizations, or 
when important state officials are the personal clients of a powerful monarch or 
dictator, sultanistic or otherwise. In these instances, the fate of both the state and 
regime tend to become fused…6 
 
Although the term “regime” denotes a more permanent political arrangement than a specific 
government,7 distinguishing between the two is often difficult. For example, in Syria, one can argue 
that the political regime and the government – embodied in the authoritarian rule of the Assad dynasty 
– are interconnected to the extent that the structures put in place by the former, for the purpose of our 
study, can hardly be conceptually detached from the latter. Though the paper at times utilizes the 
terms interchangeably, it should be noted that the usage of the term “regime” here has a dual meaning: 
It refers to the modality of governance, in addition to the ruling governmental elite. To this end, it is 
also utilized in order to refer to the Assad government’s variant of authoritarianism, as no two 
authoritarian regimes are identical.  
This project defines the dependant variable, PGMs, as armed actors, separate from the regular 
forces within the state’s coercive apparatus, that have been mobilized and/or organized into clusters 
that principally fight on behalf of the state’s central government. They are therefore meant to indicate 
“armed groups linked to the government and separate from the regular forces.”8 While terms such as 
“paramilitary” and “militia” are more commonly employed, this thesis avoids using them except 
when the context warrants it, such as when their relationship with the government is ambiguous or 
when such terms appear in the literature review and in particular discussions in which they are 
featured within quotes and passages. This is to avoid confusion, as the term “paramilitary” may also 
imply a category of the armed forces that is “inclusive of regular professional units such as police 
forces and border guards,”9 while the term “militia” may refer to any armed group operating within 
a state – whether aligned or opposed to the ruling government/regime. What matters for the purpose 
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of this discussion is the presence of armed actors employed within the Syrian COIN campaign are 
not wholly part of the official state security architecture. They generally tend to operate outside of 
the formal hierarchical command and control structure central to the institutions of the state yet 
possess varying degrees of alignment to the armed and security forces. Therefore, this thesis excludes 
from its investigation a focus on security firms/private military contractors. 
At the time of writing, much of the academic literature surrounding the usage of militias, 
paramilitaries, and PGMs are situated within the intersecting theoretical terrain of COIN, security 
studies, and civil-military affairs. This thesis thus draws on concepts from these sub-fields – including 
military organizational studies – in order to develop the framework needed for an articulate and 
comprehensive thesis. Terms like “rebel,” “insurgent,” and “militant” will also be used 
interchangeably and will refer to armed actors with varying levels of organization that principally 
function in an anti-government capacity. Since this paper excludes actors with a privatized 
component, these labels allude strictly to anti-government forces waging an insurrection against the 
ruling order. Relatedly, the terms “civil war,” “intrastate conflict,” and “insurgency” will be used to 
denote violent conflict within a state in which an officially recognized government and at least one 
other armed nonstate actor compete over the state in question.  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology employed in this thesis consists mainly of process tracing using secondary 
sources. It incorporates an assortment of qualitative and quantitative secondary data that draws on 
both academic as well as non-academic resources. These include scholarly peer-reviewed 
publications, newspaper articles, policy papers, essays, periodicals, books, and documentaries.  
 To measure regime insecurity, this thesis aims to assess key indicators of the regime, such as 
military and political cohesion. As these indicators contain an element of subjectivity, they are 
operationalized quantitatively by examining the condition of their institutional landscape, especially 
 
 8 
the state of both the security elite and the armed forces. Defections, desertions, personnel mortality 
rates, and battlefield performance are examined at key junctures, alongside the status of important 
elements of the political class. Whenever possible, the integrity of units, brigades, and divisions 
belonging to the armed and security forces are examined. This is augmented by a measure of territorial 
control. 
Potential Methodological Issues  
This thesis recognizes that the research presented here is not without its methodological issues. First, 
there exists a lack of reliable primary, local sources regarding information on the inner dynamics of 
the Assad regime. Due to its authoritarian nature, credible and verifiable governmental primary data 
is generally secretive and is not made public. Owing to the inaccessibility of accurate information 
produced by official government entities, deciphering the extent to which its military degraded over 
the course of the conflict draws in part on the research of experts that use an amalgamation of sources 
– including open-source intelligence – to corroborate their analysis. These assessments of military 
capacities are based on intelligent estimations from prominent sources. A network of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), local news outlets, and citizen activists have played a role in 
contributing to the literature on Syria. Though this thesis reviews a wide array of sources in order to 
compensate for this potential methodological shortcoming, it cannot definitively rectify these issues.  
Second, the conflict in Syria has been subject to politicisation. Washington-based think tanks, 
Russian and Iranian-funded analysts, and journalists from various media agencies have the tendency 
to represent the agendas of their sponsors, whether corporate or state-based. Conflicting narratives 
are often complicated by intellectual factionalism, restrictive editorial lines, and journalistic 
sensationalism.   
Third, given the nature and timeline of the research inquiry, several elements remain open-
ended, as the conflict in Syria is ongoing. Impartial academic literature on the events that occurred 
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post-2011 is in its infancy, while think tank analysis and journalism has saturated the discussion 
regarding both cases. Accessing concrete and objective information is an ongoing challenge. 
Fourth, due to a combination of account suspensions, violations of community protocols, and 
unstable web links, a virtual library of social media content that once existed on the Syrian conflict 
is no longer accessible. Hundreds of videos, pictures, and communiques previously viewed by the 
author have been removed from Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram since this researcher set out to 
explore PGMs. What remains pales in comparison to the once-massive reservoir of content that could 
be utilized to produce independent analysis free of secondary input.  
RELEVANCE OF RESEARCH: WHY STUDY PGMS? 
The aftermath of the Cold War brought with it a tectonic shift in political science and international 
relations scholarship. No longer exclusively fixated on the state as the sole referent object in 
international relations, the concept of security underwent a broadening beyond the traditional 
emphasis on superpower politics.10 Mutually Assured Destruction, alliance structures, the balance of 
power, and other tenets of the realist school of thought that had once dominated the academy began 
to make way for a new body of literature that gradually paid as much attention to substate and nonstate 
actors and dynamics as it did to developments within the global political arena marked primarily by 
relations between and among states.  
Although different varieties of non or ‘extrastate’ actors have featured in virtually every 
protracted armed conflict since 1947, it was not until the end of the 1990s that a focus on PGMs began 
to emerge in the academy.11 As part of an eruption of literature that focused on the prevalence of the 
so-called “new wars,”12 the study of PGMs was part of a wave of scholarly texts that analyzed the 
role of actors below and beyond the state, such as warlords, criminal enterprises, gangs, police forces, 
mercenaries, and paramilitaries,13 the latter term often used interchangeably with PGMs. Present in 
approximately two-thirds of all “irregular wars” since 1989,14 the increasing visibility of PGMs in 
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the aftermath of the Cold War sparked an interest among academics who viewed them as a growing 
component of the security landscape of intrastate conflicts in the developing world. Though PGMs 
have, in one form or another, existed since antiquity, their pervasive utilization in recent years has 
effectively made them an “inextricable part of research on political violence.”15  
However, studying PGMs does more than just contribute to a discussion on political violence. 
It informs academic and policy conversations on the diverse variants of security relations that may 
exist between states and armed actors operating within their territory that, at times, fight at their 
behest. Their tendency to oscillate between state and nonstate realms can be seen as a reflection of a 
greater academic interest unfolding that looks at ‘not-entirely state’ and ‘not entirely private’ policy 
solutions to common problems.16 Though conflict provides a useful analytical anchor, a critical 
dissection of the drivers underpinning the mobilization of these actors helps open up a space for more 
substantive conversations in the field of critical security.17 Among other important arenas, this 
includes pre and post-conflict politics, the different approaches to civil-military affairs that exist 
across democratic and authoritarian regimes and their various subtypes, and the evolving face of 
sovereignty in states mired in fragility, instability, and sociopolitical fragmentation. In fractured states 
across the MENA region, the growing role of PGMs in contributing to hybrid security governance is 
of particular relevance.18 It is within this theoretical current that this thesis on the incorporation of 
Syrian PGMs was conceived. The hope is to attempt to add an additional perspective to the literature 









CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW  
INTRODUCTION: 
This chapter reviews the literature on PGMs. It provides an overview of PGM typologies, then 
proceeds to discuss the various incentives driving governments to resort to their mobilization. Their 
utility as agents of clandestine repression and their value as security force multipliers respectively 
enable insecure governments to exercise deniability and fill a void caused by their dwindling coercive 
capabilities, specifically their loss of manpower. Moreover, their ability to deliver local knowledge 
can strengthen a military’s COIN operations by providing valuable insights on insurgent movements 
while their co-optation alongside regular forces as semi-official personnel creates an aura of 
legitimacy for governments struggling to repel both armed and ideational challenges to their rule. 
Using state weakness as a conceptual transition, this chapter examines the link between PGMs and 
civil-military affairs. Concepts such as the “civil-military problematique” and the “guardian 
dilemma” are introduced in order develop a theoretical framework that explores the causal 
relationship between authoritarian regimes, military effectiveness, and PGMs, thereby engaging with 
the literature to construct a broader analytical framework regarding one specific aspect of the context 
in which these armed actors form. This chapter concludes by introducing the concept of coup-
proofing, laying the groundwork for the next chapter’s exploration.  
PGMS, ARMED CONFLICT, AND THE STATE 
PGMs  
Though they vary in terms of purpose, structure, membership, and mandate, the prominence of PGMs 
in conflict settings has received much attention. In this regard, understanding their levels of affiliation 
with their central governments, while varying across security contexts and PGM typologies, helps 
illuminate the patterns of relations they tend to share with their host states. It also characterizes the 
policy challenges encountered by states in their utilization of PGMs during armed conflict, and 
significantly, in its aftermath.  
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Broadly speaking, the study of PGMs has generally come from two fields of research, the first 
of which is through the lens of COIN and/or irregular warfare, and the second of which focuses on 
explaining the brutality associated with these actors.19 Though the groups often overlap, the first 
subset of scholars primarily aims to assess the logistical and operational advantages of mobilizing 
PGMs throughout conflict settings, while the second seeks to provide explanations regarding why 
these armed clusters seem so inherently prone to human rights abuses.20 Both camps nevertheless 
outline the rationale driving governments to utilize PGMs as well as the issues that arise in doing so. 
Rather than examine them as distinct categories, the following section highlights the common themes 
that pervade the literature in order to shed light on the incentives that drive governments to outsource 
repressive processes to PGMs.  
PGM Typologies  
There are several typologies of PGMs, ranging from “death squads” to “auxiliary” forces. Such labels 
seek to capture the type of mobilization by referencing its core functional and organizational 
dynamics. For example, ‘self-defence’ groups and civilian guards, commonly cited in the literature 
as civil/civilian defence forces (CDF)21 or local defence forces (LDF),22 suggest arrangements in 
which collective or group security constitutes a focal point for these mobilizations. These categories 
generally refer to armed groups that recruit civilians or former rebel combatants, operate locally, and 
are ostensibly intended to be defensive rather offensive.23 
However, definitions regarding these coercive mobilizations have been a matter of 
taxonomical contention. Goron Peic, for example, goes beyond these variables to assert that CDFs 
must also include a condition based on ethnic composition, insisting that their membership should be 
drawn from the same ethnic group as the rebels.24 Moritz Schuberth, however, collectively refers to 
all such locally-operated militias as “community-based armed groups,” or CBAGs.25 According to 
Shchuberth, the boundaries of the community can be defined in terms that are linked to territory, 
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blood ties, and identity.26 Though they may be “hired by national political actors in order to defend 
or topple a regime,” he reasons, “the community that serves as [a] referent object for CBAGs is by 
definition incongruent with the nation state. Rather, the community is a localized subunit of the 
nation; in some cases, it transcends state boundaries.”27  
Significantly, by asserting that the ontology of CBAGs inherently puts them at odds with the 
state, the alignment of such actors with governments therefore represents a secondary focus 
overshadowed by their communal outlook and orientation. This conceptualization denotes a condition 
of impermanence among PGMs that operate locally, suggesting that their co-optation by governments 
represents a temporary arrangement. The allusion to the impermanence of the relationship between 
governments, PGMs, and the state is captured by Corinna Jentzsch et al, who define militias as armed 
groups that are “often controlled or co-opted by government representatives,” but whose loyalties and 
agendas may shift to become incompatible with the interests of the state.28 To them, the critical 
component pervading PGMs is their “anti-rebel dimension.”29  
Other typologies, such as “death squads”30 and “vigilantes,”31 while important, are more 
prone to politicization, particularly owing to their normative undertones. For example, though the 
term vigilante can refer to any armed group operating extra-judicially,32 Schuberth contends that they 
are often explored through the framework of state failure, whereas militias explicitly linked to the 
government usually arise within the context of “new wars” and “new barbarism,” and “tend to be 
investigated through the lens of patronage and clientelism.”33 However, as Julie Mazzei points out, 
“self defense group and death squad are [often] rhetorical devices used by the organizations to 
insinuate virtuosity and legitimacy.”34 Thus, when subjected to politicization within the academy, 
even if unconscious, these terms have the tendency to obscure, as opposed to enrich, our 
understanding of the topic. While there indeed exists a proclivity to use certain categories of PGMs 
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as death squads, absent an elaborate conceptual explanation, the label itself does not sufficiently 
encapsulate the dynamics of such groups.  
Though the conceptual demarcation between various militia subtypes is subjective, they 
nevertheless provide instructive categories for analytical exploration. Sabine Carey et al, who 
developed the first comprehensive dataset on PGMs,35 constructed useful taxonomies to capture these 
armed groups. After collecting data on 332 PGMs that existed between 1981 and 2007, they define 
them as actors that are armed, fight in a pro-government capacity (either nationally or subnationally), 
are identified as being separate from the regular security forces, and possess some basic level of 
organization.36 Moreover, Carey et al fundamentally differentiate between two categories of PGMs: 
“informal” and “semi-official.” According to them: 
Informal PGMs are armed, supported by or act on the side of the government and 
are described as progovernment, government militia, linked to the government, 
government-backed, or government-allied. Examples include the Young Patriots in 
Cote d’Ivoire, the Ansar-e Hezbollah in Iran, and the Interahamwe Militia in 
Rwanda during the early 1990s. ‘Death squads’, even when closely linked to the 
government, are normally informal and clandestine, and are categorized as informal 
PGMs. A semi-official PGM has a recognized legal or semi-official status, in 
contrast to the looser affiliation of informal PGMs. A semi-official PGM is separate 
from the regular forces and identified as a distinct organization. Examples of semi-
official PGMs include Village Defence Committees in India, the Revolutionary 
Committees in Libya under Gaddafi, and the Rondas Campesinas in Peru.37 
 
Here, the application of the term “death squads” avoids normativity and is instead situated within a 
broader definitional framework that focuses on the linkages between this PGM category and the 
government with which it is affiliated. Informal PGMs generally represent situations in which a 
government tries to establish distance between its political representatives and the groups to which it 
outsources repression. Due to their covert nature, informal PGMs are far less institutionalized into 
the state’s apparatus.38 In contrast, semi-official PGMs are commonly trained, equipped, and paid 
openly, and tend to receive regular compensation. Because semi-official PGMs usually operate 
publicly, they often attract the labels “auxiliaries,” “paramilitary forces,” and “state-aligned 
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vigilantes.”39 Here, the term “state-aligned vigilantes,” by using the mobilization’s relationship with 
the state as a conceptual focal point, provides an instructive definitional category as well. 
In a subsequent study, Sabine Carey and Neil Mitchell40 survey the literature in order to 
expand on this typology. To them, PGMs have two crucial elements – links to government and links 
to society – the degree to which these connections crystalize vary across context and PGM subtype. 
The first element is separated into the informal and semi-official PGM conceptualizations mentioned 
above, while the second can be broken down into two further classifications, defined by whether or 
not these groups recruit and operate locally.41 According to them, membership characteristics in these 
formations can be driven by a number of factors and are often facilitated by ideological, religious, 
and ethnic divisions.42 Moreover, tribal, ethnosectarian, and partisan cleavages may further induce 
recruitment in what they classify as “civilian mobilizations.” “Non-civilian mobilizations,” by 
contrast, usually include off-duty police or military personnel, former members of the state’s coercive 
apparatus, as well as forces acting in a mercenary capacity.43 However, the authors note that 
sometimes these labels can converge and reinforce one another.  
Huseyn Aliyev offers a slightly different conceptualization for PGMs. Building on their work, 
he distinguishes between what he calls “state-manipulated” militias characteristic of the Cold War 
and “state-parallel” militias, which represent an increasingly widespread phenomenon.44 According 
to Aliyev: 
[T]he plurality of paramilitary organizations in recent history falls into two generic 
yet inherently distinct categories of ‘state-manipulated’ and ‘state-parallel’ 
paramilitaries. The former includes the majority of the typical self-defence units, 
death squads and pro-regime ‘enforcers’ that dominated civil wars and irregular 
conflicts from the start of the Cold War era until the late 1990s. The latter…are 
more widespread and influential today. These groups include, but are not limited 
to, popular mobilization forces, offensive substate counterinsurgents, and tribal or 




Citing the robust role the Popular Mobilization Forces played in fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and 
al-Sham (ISIS) in Iraq, he argues that a qualitative difference exists between the two PGM categories, 
as state-parallel militias’ “superiority—either military or structural—over conventional armed forces, 
their financial and structural independence from the host regime, and their indispensability for the 
survival of the state elevate these groups to a position parallel to that of the state and place them 
beyond the state’s control.”46 Therefore, as opposed to being utterly reliant on their host governments, 
the horizontal power configuration of these actors makes the government dependent on them for 
survival when faced with armed rebellions that challenge their authority. 
 However, state-PGM relations are dynamic and subject to ongoing change, as militia subtypes 
can transform and evolve depending on the context.47 This is particularly because they generally exist 
in fragile settings marked by conflict and post-conflict security climates. As such, they occupy a wider 
spectrum of relationships than is commonly perceived. Using this typology, formations that act as 
state-manipulated PGMs at one point in time may garner enough power and resources to effectively 
become ones that rival the state. Similarly, groups that operate as state-parallel militias may, for any 
number of reasons, be relegated to become dependent on the government. This same logic applies to 
informal and semi-official PGMs.  
While these classifications contain important differences, it is best to think of PGM 
configurations as fluid. The balance of power between the two entities can shift based on any number 
of factors internally and externally, including the duration of war, the level of strength of the central 
government, and the degree to which PGMs are able to accrue financial support from private patrons, 
outside states, and illicit operations – such as smuggling, racketeering, kidnapping, and extortion. For 
example, in 2011, prior to their broad mobilization into the National Defence Forces (NDF) and other 
PGMs, the shabiha of Syria strictly acted as shadowy, state-manipulated or informal government-
backed mobilizations, representing an arrangement in which these armed clusters executed operations 
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outsourced to them by the Assad regime.48 However, as the conflict became protracted, the shabiha 
were significantly empowered by their nominal integration into such structures, utilizing their 
membership to pursue a culture of warlordism – a condition in which armed actors exercise local 
and/or regional control over both political and coercive power – while the regime’s grip on power 
grew increasingly tenuous.  
Given their fluidity, it is best to examine PGMs in relation to the strategies adopted by states 
in dealing with them. Paul Staniland49 agrees that government-PGM relations are much more diverse 
than what the conventional wisdom suggests, yet he argues that regime ideology shapes how 
governments perceive and deal with militias operating on their territory. According to Staniland, 
militias can be “violently targeted by regimes, absorbed into the state apparatus, or contained as a low 
level but endemic challenge. They are not intrinsically subservient junior partners of governments.”50 
Accordingly, he outlines four main strategies that states can pursue in relation to militias: suppression, 
incorporation, containment, and collusion, the latter described as “a strategy of active, sustained 
cooperation between a state and an organized armed actor, ranging from explicitly holding back 
police and military action against armed actors to actively providing guns, logistics, and training to 
them.”51 For the purpose of this chapter, collusion represents the most important strategy. The 
following section examines the incentives driving the usage of PGMs. 
Literature on Incentives to Use PGMs 
There exists an emerging mass of literature that attempts to make sense of the usage of PGMs during 
armed conflict. What accounts for their pervasiveness in wartime? Specifically, what incentivizes 
governments to mobilize PGMs? What type of benefits does their deployment yield? When does this 
option become attractive? What can they teach us about the application of such irregular forces?  
In a study conducted by Peic,52 he found that governments that did not have links to militias 
at the outset of a conflict did so by the end, with relations developing on average four years in. 
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Analyzing two cross-national datasets of insurgencies that occurred between 1944 and 2006, he 
concludes that a state is 53% more likely to eviscerate the threat emanating from insurgents through 
the deployment of CDFs as an instrument of COIN strategy. Given that this finding represents a view 
often alluded to in the literature, it is worth examining why. Why do PGMs help governments produce 
victorious outcomes against anti-government forces? What role do they play in doing so?  
The four main benefits associated with PGMs relate to their deployment as force multipliers, 
their capacity to act as a source of local or indigenous knowledge, their utility as agents of repression 
for which the state can claim plausible deniability, and their ability to help governments maintain 
legitimacy.53 These will be examined in order. 
Force Multipliers 
First, PGMs often serve as force multipliers. Also referred to as “auxiliary forces,”54 the role they 
play as augmenters of coercion gives emaciated militaries a much-needed boost to their capacity to 
engage in armed combat. Their ability to buttress governments struggling to put down civil unrest or 
crush insurgencies provides desperate and insecure rulers with a tool to amplify their military 
capabilities against unconventional adversaries. This helps them continue battling during COIN 
campaigns or civil wars in which the regular forces are exhausted, demoralized, and depleted due to 
the duress suffered under conflict. The particularly gruelling nature of intrastate conflict makes this 
process all the more likely.  
The fact that PGM mobilization occurs on average four years into a conflict suggests that 
conflict must endure long enough or be impactful enough to motivate governments to seek exogenous 
security support from such actors. It also indicates that the incorporation of PGMs (particularly semi-
official PGMs) into a government’s COIN campaign commonly occurs out of necessity, resulting 
from the attrition of official forces and the inability to decisively obtain victory over insurgent 
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combatants. In this regard, PGMs provide an attractive solution for governments seeking to fill a void 
left by the diminution of regular personnel. 
The utilization of irregular forces that are cheap and expendable can deliver a quantitative 
advantage to militaries suffering from impeded operational capacities due to defections, desertions, 
and death.55 This permits the regular forces to pursue offensive operations against insurgents while 
PGMs, in principle, secure territory.56 For example, the delegation of policing functions to PGMs 
makes possible their incorporation into localized security arrangements, thereby relinquishing the 
need for official units, which can instead be deployed to strategic battlefronts. Administering 
community watches and patrols, as well as operating checkpoints and outposts within 
neighbourhoods/villages and along key roads, all contribute to augmenting the overall security efforts 
of the state.57 Beyond their intended defensive role, however, they are often used in an offensive 
capacity to substitute for eroding military capabilities among conventional forces, whose numbers 
relative to rebel mobilizations may not permit them to advance and recapture land, let alone 
consolidate control. As we will see in Chapter 4, PGMs in Syria, beyond defensive operations, were 
dispatched in an offensive capacity to retake territory from armed militants.  
Local Knowledge 
Second, PGMs can provide local, specialized knowledge. This is generally the case with formations 
that rely on local recruits and operate in areas within which they possess intimate ties, such as LDFs 
and other community-based militias, including former rebels. The specialized knowledge which is 
derived from the diversification of forces and integration of local insights is an invaluable tool in 
routing out insurgents. Since the insurgents’ “ability to hide in plain sight is a critical subelement in 
the competition for security,”58 the proper identification of anti-government combatants and their 
extended infrastructure is arguably the most foundational component of any successful COIN 
strategy.59 Therefore, acquiring accurate, on-the-ground intel is often key to orchestrating operations 
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against rebels and other insurrectionists. Here, the ability of PGMs to function as auxiliary sources of 
intelligence helps optimize the allocation of government resources, which also tend to dissolve as the 
conflict protracts.  
While local collaborators can assist insurgents, they can also aid government forces. The 
insights of LDFs and their extended networks, which also include civilian supporters, can often be 
channelled to strike at targets that are key to sustaining insurgent capabilities.60 For example, during 
the 2003 Iraq War, one of the greatest obstacles faced by Coalition and Iraqi forces was their inability 
to identify the insurgents in what later became known as the “Sunni Insurgency.”61 This dilemma was 
overcome only after the U.S. Army partnered with the Sahwa/Sons of Iraq (SOI) – local tribal militias 
consisting primarily of disgruntled Sunni Muslims who had previously joined the insurgency – which 
then provided American soldiers with valuable intelligence regarding the composition and location 
of cells belonging to Al-Qaeda in Iraq.62 The provision of local intelligence is especially crucial when 
the areas are of considerable strategic value or when the governments battling insurgents wish to 
minimize civilian casualties, otherwise known as “collateral damage.” 
Additionally, such intelligence can help governments, should they choose, utilize tactics 
associated with the “hearts-and-minds” COIN doctrine63 in order to either regain or maintain the 
loyalty of populations once under the control of insurgents, or ones potentially receptive to their 
message. For example, the previously mentioned partnership between the SOI and American forces 
in Iraq was credited with almost completely defeating AQI by 2010. The drastic reduction in 
casualties for both militaries in part stemmed from the co-option of the SOI, which helped Americans 
build bridges with Iraq’s disenfranchised Sunni communities. This was partially the result of the 
implementation of what then-General Petraeus, who oversaw the program, called a “surge of ideas,” 
which above all stressed the “the explicit recognition that the most important terrain in the campaign 




Third, PGMs deliver an element of deniability. In civil wars, shadowy informal PGMs to which 
coercion is outsourced are often used so that governments can commit atrocities while distancing 
themselves from such acts. Here, the application of severe violence serves two primary purposes 
under the umbrella of deniability. First, it enables rulers to send a strong – albeit tacit – message to 
rebels and segments of the population with whom they are viewed sympathetically. Second, it 
removes constraints associated with the use of force by permitting governments to exercise brutal and 
indiscriminate repression in order to more efficiently put down rebellions with little-to-no regard for 
the civilian populations. The clout provided by the aura of deniability, governments often reason, 
makes possible the use of extreme volumes of force while evading culpability in the eyes of loyalist 
segments of their population in addition to external states.65  
As Ariel Ahram point outs, deniability as an incentive is most often associated with low-
capacity autocracies and weak democracies who are the recipients of foreign aid.66 According to 
Ahram, the usage of shadowy, informal PGMs by rulers represents “the enactment of distinctive 
repertoires of violence” that occur between state and nonstate “specialists” in violence, with the 
efficiency and effectiveness of covertly deploying the former facilitating what he describes as “state-
organized crime.”67 While Carey et al find this correlation to be highest among weak democratic 
regimes, whose reliance on such aid makes them particularly likely to embrace informal ties to 
militias, they nevertheless agree regarding the desire to avoid culpability, arguing that PGM 
deployment should be viewed as a “deliberate government strategy to avoid accountability.”68  
The calculus at the core of the decision to use PGMs here is to maintain, at the very least, a 
veneer of innocence as not to jeopardize forfeiting financial assistance. While the foreign 
governments from which they receive support may view human suffering as inconsequential, they 
often seek to avoid being perceived as associated or implicated in atrocities committed by 
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governments with which they openly enjoy good relations. One study even found the presence of 
PGMs to be a reliable predictive indicator of state-led mass killing, helping governments that face 
internal threats “tip the balance” by lowering the cost of repression.69 This is because they can be 
utilized as death squads, whose primary “job” is to commit extra-judicial murder.70 Since PGMs are 
generally dispatched as governmental proxy forces, the covert subcontracting of the state’s monopoly 
of coercion to these actors fits within a rational choice model in which the state seeks exogenous 
support when needed.71 Central to deniability, paradoxically, is the desire to conduct repression with 
impunity. 
Legitimacy 
The fourth primary utility of PGMs is that they permit the ruling government to maintain legitimacy.72  
This builds on both their deployment as force augmenters and their role in upholding the veneer of 
deniability. With regards to the latter, the government’s ability to distance itself from criminality 
organized at its behest is critical for maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the general populace. 
Although elements of the populace that are recipients of repression committed by informal PGMs are 
often cognizant of government culpability, the ability of governments to conceal their role in this 
process to the majority of the population helps them retain support when faced with challenges to 
their rule.  
Here, the type of PGM used is particularly important. Broadly, the incorporation of informal 
PGMs with clandestine links to the government sustains the element of deniability as a source of 
legitimation. With regards to the role that semi-official PGMs play as force augmenters, however, 
legitimacy is derived from the government’s ability to claim to assert territorial control in formal 
partnership with these actors. Particularly in revolutionary conflict, where the legitimacy of the 
government and the very nature of the state becomes a matter of ideological contestation due to 
competing claims to sovereign rule (reinforced by the significant coercive capacity of rival actors),73 
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the presence of PGMs can serve as a propaganda boost by reminding civilians of the reach of state 
authority – even if that authority is embodied in armed actors that commonly operate outside of 
officially established chains of command. This is especially true when the PGMs tasked with 
administering security governance begin as variants of LDFs that develop organically in response to 
security concerns and are later mobilized by the government into robust national PGMs with a certain 
degree of legal recognition.  
Depending on the mandate, conduct, and type of PGM, this can help the government maintain 
an image of normalcy. By stating that these armed actors, once ‘professionalized,’ are operating under 
its auspices, governments can claim that they are winning the war, repelling insurgents, and re-
establishing law and order. The reassertion of territorial control and the optics surrounding the 
reestablishment of ‘orderly’ social, political, and security relations helps ultimately denote the 
functional value of PGMs as governmental purveyors. Beyond allowing governments to militarily 
capitalize on PGM outposts, it serves as a reminder that the state is present.  
STATE WEAKNESS: CAUSE OR CONSEQUENCE? 
The question regarding the causal relationship between PGMs and the state is a contentious one that 
gives rise to several perspectives. Some scholars point to state weakness as one such determinant, 
claiming that weak states tend to have a greater reliance on these actors.74 Aliyev, for example, claims 
that two conditions must exist for PGMs to be present. The first, which he considers “an essential 
precondition,” is state weakness while the second is armed conflict.75 Similarly, Ahram makes seven 
conclusions regarding PGMs, but asserts that above all, “low state capacity is singularly correlated 
with the appearance and activity of all forms of PGMs.”76 Michael Klare, however, argues that when 
a state is already in decline, PGMs expedite the process of state failure by making its downfall 
irreversible.77 Robert Bates contends that militias, specifically those that emerge when rival 
politicians create ‘private’ armies, point to one of the variables that evidences state failure.78 He 
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examines them as part of a trajectory characterized by a situation in which rulers employ their 
coercive mechanisms not for the purpose of protecting wealth, but for preying on it.79  
Such analyses, in one way or another, view the prevalence of PGMs in terms of the degree to 
which a state is considered weak,80 and therefore, vulnerable to nonstate challengers. While the 
conventional bifurcation between “strong” and “weak” states is a matter of theoretical and definitional 
debate, understanding the principal differences between states classified as strong or weak is helpful 
for our discussion. Instead of viewing states as operating strictly in a dichotomous fashion, Robert 
Rotberg81 argues that weak states exist along a broad continuum. Nevertheless, he conceptualizes the 
core attributes associated with weak states within the literature. According to Rotberg: 
Weak states include a broad continuum of states that are: inherently weak because 
of geographical, physical, or fundamental economic constraints; basically strong, 
but temporarily or situationally weak because of internal antagonisms, management 
flaws, greed, despotism, or external attacks; and a mixture of the two. Weak states 
typically harbor ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal tensions that 
have not yet, or not yet thoroughly, become overtly violent. Urban crime rates tend 
to be higher and increasing. In weak states, the ability to provide adequate measures 
of other political goods is diminished or diminishing. Physical infrastructural 
networks have deteriorated. Schools and hospitals show signs of neglect, 
particularly outside the main cities. GDP per capita and other critical economic 
indicators have fallen or are falling, sometimes dramatically; levels of venal 
corruption are embarrassingly high and escalating. Weak states usually honor rule 
of law precepts in the breach. They harass civil society. Weak states are often ruled 
by despots, elected or not.82 
 
To be sure, a state need not possess every attribute in the passage above to qualify as weak. That said, 
Rotberg’s characterization aptly highlights the most common trends among weak states.  
With regards to PGMs, however, the emphasis on state capacity often blurs the line between 
cause and consequence. Indeed, to argue that weak state capacity is both a cause and consequence of 
the emergence of PGMs creates a causal sequence in which the actions of the government, propelled 
by its inherent weakness, entail the outsourcing of coercive authority to armed actors which then have 
the power to rival the state altogether, ultimately weakening it. While this causal sequence – 
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specifically, the sequential process underpinning the decentralization of state power – warrants 
greater theoretical extrapolation, it is outside of the scope of this thesis. Thus, instead of engaging in 
a discussion in which state weakness is both a cause and a consequence of PGM formation, the 
following section focuses on one constant that can concretely be applied83 to both cases under 
examination in this thesis in a manner that provides a clear theoretical delineation. Here, the point is 
to critically engage with an explanation that directly accounts for why PGMs in the Syrian context 
were utilized to begin with. Why did Syria’s coercive forces under Assad erode against insurgents 
that were qualitatively and quantitatively inferior? Why did the regime view PGM formation as 
necessary? In order to answer these questions, we must address the final sentence of Rotberg’s 
passage, namely that weak states are often ruled by despots. 
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND MILITARY PERFORMANCE 
Scholars of civil-military relations have written extensively on patterns underlining how the armed 
and security forces of the state intersect with both its political institutions and society at large.84 At 
its core, the field is propelled by the attempt to theorize how coercive and non-coercive realms of the 
state co-exist, including questions regarding who controls the military and how, in addition to 
prescriptions that aim to ascertain its appropriate role in the polity.85 Said differently, the interaction 
between the repressive apparatus and the polity is driven by an effort to understand and, arguably, 
resolve what Peter Feaver calls the “civil-military problematique.”86 According to Feaver:  
The civil-military challenge is to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything 
the civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what 
civilians authorize them to do. This is a special case of the general problem of 
political agency: how do you ensure that your agent is doing your will, especially 
when your agent has guns and so may enjoy more coercive power than you do? 
 
The paradoxical predicament outlined by Feaver is at the heart of the field. Also referred to as the 
“guardianship dilemma,” this “existential imperative gives rise to one of the oldest dilemmas of 
governing, for a guardian strong enough to protect the government is also strong enough to impose 
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its own preferences on the polity.”87 According to Blake McMahon and Branislav Slantchev, a 
government has two fundamental policy avenues at its disposal for responding to this predicament: it 
“either creates the forces it needs and takes its chances that they may turn on it or avoids that danger 
altogether by leaving itself exposed to the other threats.”88 
In a sense, all civil-military configurations are an attempt to rectify this dilemma and develop 
pathways for optimizing the relationship between governments and their security forces. The policies 
adopted by governments impact national security due to their role in dictating the strategic 
assessments of the people in charge.89 However, democratic and authoritarian regimes tend to have 
different priorities, and thus, divergent approaches.90  
In democratic regimes, an emphasis on safeguarding the state – i.e., “national security” – 
reinforced by structural and constitutional checks and balances, principally drives all considerations. 
This broadly results in more coherent military and security institutions, leading to higher performance 
on the battlefield. In the first significant study of its kind, Allan Stam and Dan Reiter examine why 
democracies enjoy a proclivity towards victory during wartime.91 Aside from the tendency among 
democratic regimes to be more selective in the conflicts they wage, Stam and Reiter contend that 
higher operational capacity within their armed forces stems from the more efficient allocation of 
assets, but also because promotions are more likely to be based on merit. As a result, democratic 
military institutions tend to enjoy leadership that is less politicized and troop morale that is generally 
higher.92 In light of their emphasis on performance – not politics – officers who preside over positions 
of authority are expected, in principle, to have proven capabilities that are empirically corroborated 
by extensive track records. While it is difficult to avoid politicization in its entirety, accountability, 
transparency, and openness to criticism in democratic military structures foster institutional cultures 
in which improvement on the battlefield is an ongoing pursuit, thereby facilitating constant evolution 
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and reform. Though not without their defects, the same underlying logic is presumed to apply to the 
security agencies.  
In contrast, in authoritarian regimes, rulers prioritize their own personal security over that of 
the state. As such, they are more likely to view the armed and security forces with suspicion. Their 
response to the civil-military problematique and the guardianship dilemma is therefore to commonly 
engage in a practice known as “coup-proofing,” which refers to an aggregation of strategies, tactics, 
and mechanisms that function to prevent the threat of mutiny that may emanate from the security 
forces.93 While varying across authoritarian subtypes, the general ontology is driven by the desire to 
counterbalance security forces against one another. This process of counterbalancing is particularly 
associated with personalist authoritarian structures defined by weak formal institutions (as well as 
pervasive informal linkages to the ruler), narrow support bases, and a lack of unifying ideologies.94 
As opposed to democracies, which view coup-proofing as less necessary and less effective,95 the 
strategic assessments in dictatorships prioritize promoting the concerns of the ruler – chief among 
them, the fixation on indefinitely prolonging their grip on power – over the cultivation of strong and 
effective militaries.  
While instituting coup-proofing mechanisms may protect autocratic rulers from being 
deposed by the armed forces, it also severely weakens the strength and resilience of their coercive 
institutions. This is not simply because coup-proofing prioritizes the preservation of the ruler ahead 
of the integrity of the armed and security forces – and by extension, the state – but because it does so 
at their expense. Time and effort are allocated away from fostering professionalism and towards 
composing an institutional apparatus that rewards loyalty and divides the security infrastructure as to 
render it incapable of meaningfully challenging the head of state. Here, counterbalancing serves to 
structurally neutralize the capacity of the armed forces to formulate a united bloc capable of 
dethroning the ruler.96 In essence, however, this denotes the politicization and subordination of the 
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armed forces in a manner that hinders their ability to coherently and independently function. Since 
this deliberate process leads to a lack of cohesiveness within their institutions, they consistently 
under-perform during armed conflict.97 One large-N study analyzing the link between coup-proofing 
and military performance in interstate wars empirically demonstrates how the former negatively 
impacts the latter.98 Citing coup-proofing’s adverse effect on military leadership qualities, initiative, 
and coordination, the authors state that “the higher a country’s coup-proofing efforts relative to its 
opponent, the worse its effectiveness on the battlefield.” 99  
Therefore, coup-proofing often plays a role in contributing to the “militiafication”100 of the 
armed forces during conflict. This is particularly likely to occur in intrastate conflict marked by 
gruelling levels of attrition, especially when such conflicts contain ethnic, sectarian, and/or tribal 
dimensions or when the militaries and security agencies are dominated by one particular 
ethnoconfessional component of society,101 as is common across states in the MENA region 
containing heterogenous societies. Said differently, “the tendency of some Middle Eastern states 
(notably Syria and Iraq) to ‘coup-proof’ their militaries render them even more dependent on militias 
when faced with sustained internal revolt, as their regular armed forces collapse under the stress of 
combat. In this respect, there is a direct link between ‘coup-proofing,’ dependence on irregular 
auxiliaries in civil war, and the erosion of the state’s integrity.”102 Since the attributes needed to 
combat armed actors opposing the government – leadership, morale, transparency, cohesiveness, 
ideological unity – are absent due to coup-proofing, militaries often erode fairly quickly. The next 
chapter examines the coup-proofing variant utilized by Assad, illustrating how it ultimately laid the 
groundwork for his reliance on PGMs to substitute for the loss of personnel and the erosion of the 





CHAPTER 3 - COUP-PROOFING UNDER ASSAD 
  
INTRODUCTION: 
This chapter introduces a general framework for coup-proofing in the Middle East. It then examines 
the coup-proofing variant utilized by the Assad regime, highlighting how it deliberately undermined 
the cohesiveness of its coercive forces in order to insulate the head of state from the prospect of 
violent overthrow through a palace coup. The construction of multiple chains of command and the 
development of elite units that operated as parallel militaries fomented a deeply dysfunctional armiy. 
Moreover, the production of a plurality of rival intelligence agencies that were tasked with spying on 
the populace, the armed forces, and on one another, meant that these institutions were designed 
overwhelmingly to preserve the presidency. The appointment of ‘trusted’ elements of society based 
not on merit but on perceptions of loyalty sectarianized these institutions by drawing heavily on 
Assad’s own ethnoconfessional community – the Alawites. This created a class of officers drawn to 
these positions because of the material privileges they entailed as a reward for their loyalty, resulting 
in systemic levels of corruption. Overall, his regime’s coup-proofing practices impeded the ability of 
the military to function, exacerbated sectarian divisions within society, and ultimately set the stage 
for a destructive feedback loop in which the military-security elite turned to PGMs in order to 
substitute for the loss of their personnel and rapid erosion of the command structures of the armed 
forces.   
COUP-PROOFING IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
Coup d’états have featured heavily in the contemporary Middle East. In the region’s Arab states alone, 
for example, fifty-five coups were attempted between 1949 and 1980, half of which were 
successful.103 Acutely conscious of the region’s post-colonial legacy of mutinies, coup-proofing 
became viewed by Middle Eastern despots as a means to insulate themselves from the likelihood of 
violent deposition orchestrated by their coercive forces. 
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In a seminal book on the practice, titled Coup d’etat: A Practical Handbook,104 Edward 
Luttwak catalogued a number of practices pertaining to modern coups. Iraq and Syria feature in his 
book as being among the most likely states to succumb to a coup not just regionally, but globally.105 
In fact, prior to the ascension of Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein, Syria is believed to have 
witnessed as many as 20 coup attempts,106 seven of which were successful, while Iraq underwent six 
coups. In 1936, the latter experienced the first coup in the modern Arab world.107 
Coup-proofing, much like the name implies, refers to the “set of actions a regime takes to 
prevent a military coup,” the essence of which is “the creation of structures that minimize the 
possibilities of small groups leveraging the system to such ends.”108 Though the models of coup-
proofing vary from one case to another, three elements are particularly common in the Middle East: 
counterbalancing, the provision of material incentives to maintain the allegiance of the officer class, 
and the exploitation of communities considered ‘trustworthy’ – generally those from which the ruler 
hails. In possibly the first comprehensive paper on the topic written in the post-Cold War era, James 
Quinlivan109 identifies five main strategies utilized in coup-proofing by Middle Eastern dictatorships, 
three of which are pertinent to our discussion: first, the exploitation and manipulation of family, 
ethnic, and religious loyalties; second, the establishment of an armed security force that runs parallel 
to the military; and third, “the development of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping 
jurisdiction that constantly monitor the loyalty of the military and one another with independent paths 
of communication to critical leaders.”110 The development of parallel elite units, which function as 
“praetorian guards,” are utilized as a “counterweight [to] the regular armed forces—forces that can 
be used against the regime in a coup,” and are usually “bound to the regime through special loyalties 
and social relationships.”111  
For example, both Saddam and Hafez presided over regimes that officially espoused 
Ba’athism, a romanticized ideological offshoot of Arab Nationalism centered on a syncretic mix of 
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socialism, Pan-Arabism, and secularism. Yet despite Ba’athism’s emphasis on secularism and 
rejection of sectarian and tribal identifiers, both rulers nevertheless depended heavily on the 
exploitation of these communal cleavages, staffing their respective security elites largely with 
elements drawn from their own familial, ethnoconfessional, and tribal constituents. This tendency 
was so pervasive that it has become a cliché to refer to the Iraqi regime constructed under Saddam as 
“Tikriti” and the Syrian regime developed under Hafez as “Alawite” – the former based on Saddam’s 
hometown and the latter in reference to the minority religious denomination from which Hafez 
hailed.112 Therefore, while perceptions of communal loyalty do indeed matter, they are less indicative 
of an attempt to elevate the status of any particular religious, ethnic, or tribal group per se. Rather, 
they are best thought of as self-interested tactics implemented by authoritarian rulers to bind certain 
groups, especially those from which they hail, to their rule.  
This process is intended to induce mass buy-in for these communities, which then come to 
form the spinal cord of the coercive apparatus, the aim of which is to deter their potential 
rebelliousness by raising the stakes for defection.113 Beyond simply preventing coups, such strategies 
tie the state’s security infrastructure to the regime in a manner that makes them mutually dependent 
on one another, particularly in systems in which “patrimonial linkages between the regime and 
coercive apparatus further enmesh the two.”114 This is especially true when the community associated 
with regime constitutes a minority, adheres to a collective narrative of historical persecution, or exists 
in a setting in which contestation for the state foments distrust and violence between its members and 
their ethnoconfessional counterparts.  
COUP-PROOFING IN ASSAD’S SYRIA 
Historic Precursors: Minority Insecurity and the Rise of the Alawites 
In the period immediately preceding its independence, Syria was ruled by France as part of the 
Mandate system. This lasted formally between 1923-1943. During this time, the French instituted a 
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series of policies that resulted in lasting social and political consequences. Among such policies, they 
sought to effectuate the enlistment of large numbers of minorities into the military.115 In particular, 
Syria’s Alawites, an offshoot of Shia Islam with a heterodox character, were encouraged partially for 
what French colonial advisors perceived as their supposed “war-like” character and receptiveness to 
non-Islamic rule.116 They were also viewed as potentially more loyal than their Sunni counterparts, 
particularly the urban elite, which maintained historic ties with Turkey in part due to their 
collaboration in governing under Ottoman rule.117 Many of the Alawites, who resided primarily in 
the mountains adjacent to Syria’s Mediterranean coast, benefitted from this arrangement, as it granted 
them the possibility of utilizing military recruitment as a vehicle for attaining upward social mobility. 
This represented one of the few available options for escaping the abject poverty present in their rural 
communities, which had stemmed in large part from a history of persecution and subordination under 
‘Sunni’ majoritarian governance.118 
As the Mandate system came to a close, many of Syria’s religious minorities, key among them 
the Alawites, began to rally under the banner of Arab Nationalism. The gravitation towards this 
ideology, which at its core is secular, was envisaged by politically conscious elements of the 
community as a path towards the development of an inclusive society in which they could attain a 
degree of security from alternative ideological currents that placed a heavier emphasis on Islam as a 
source of identity.119 This dynamic gained momentum in post-independence Syria, and against this 
backdrop, minorities in general – and Alawites in particular – continued to disproportionately enlist 
in the military as a means of social advancement. Some also pursued careers in the intelligence 
agencies, which were originally modelled after the French Deuxième Bureau.120 The newly formed 
coercive institutions of the state became an important post-colonial destination for employment 
among members of the community. For example, by 1955, the Alawites, who constituted between 
10-12% of the state’s demographic composition, made up 65% of non-commissioned officers – a 
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disproportionate balance that remained a major legacy of the French period.121 With a history “[a]s a 
degraded minority, the Alawis saw the military as the only professional arena into which they could 
penetrate.”122 In part due to the desire to ensure that their rights as citizens would be protected, many 
of these officers eventually leaned towards Ba’athism, which in the 1960s had gained popularity 
amongst the country’s minority sects. Its promise of achieving social progress, along with its 
promotion of secular principles, made it particularly attractive to the Alawites, as it underlined a sense 
of identity that superseded ethnosectarian and tribal affiliations.123 It is within this context that Hafez 
came to power in 1970.124  
Hafez’ Meticulous Coup-Proofing Apparatus 
In 1970, after years of careful plotting, Hafez launched a coup that resulted in his capture of the state. 
Dubbed the “Corrective Movement” by Hafez and his followers,125 the putsch culminated in the 
overthrow of fellow Alawite officer Salah Jadid, who was the last remaining member of the five-
person Ba’athist military junta that had effectively ruled Syria behind the scenes from 1963 to 
1970.126 Hafez, who had been a member of the secret committee until his falling with Jadid, ousted 
the officer and purged his faction’s known supporters from the institutions of the state. He then 
utilized his unrivalled authority to launch a set of crackdowns and ‘reforms’ that were instrumental 
in his consolidation of power.127 Having installed himself through a military coup, Hafez and his 
officers, many of whom were Alawite, became part of a regime that presided over a society in which 
their authority was widely viewed as illegitimate. Since opposition to the new regime existed across 
Syria’s political, social, and ethnoconfessional landscape (including from among his co-religionists, 
many of whom supported the Jadidist left-wing faction of the Ba’ath),128 the authoritarian ruler 
devised and implemented a system of coup-proofing methods that sought to keep him in power 
indefinitely. These methods relied heavily on balancing religious communities against one another in 
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a security apparatus designed overwhelmingly to insulate the head of the regime – Hafez – from being 
overthrown. 
Leveraging Communal Insecurity: A Calculated Balancing Act 
The Assad regime under Hafez drew on a comprehensive system of coup-proofing mechanisms. 
While the regime’s claim to be serving a Ba’athist doctrine and acting on behalf of “the Party” gave 
it the appearance of secularism (indeed, the Syrian constitution did not discriminate on a religious 
basis), it unofficially utilized a series of sectarian strategies with the deliberate intention of coercively 
balancing religious communities against one another. For example, within the SAA, “leading 
positions in brigades and divisions were assigned through an unwritten but well known [sic] formula 
– to Syrians at least: if the leader is Sunni, it means that the deputy must be Alawite, while a third 
leading position is reserved for other groups like Christians or Druze.”129 “The only exception to this 
formula,” however, occurred in the intelligence agencies, “where Alawites always enjoyed a 
comfortable majority both in numbers and in leadership positions.”130  
This process of “sectarian stacking” has long been central to the regime’s coup-proofing 
apparatus and features heavily across coercive institutions.131 Within the SAA, for example, while 
the rank-and-file consists mainly of Sunni Muslim conscripts, who constitute roughly 70% of the 
country’s population, the vast majority of career soldiers, including the officer corps, are drawn from 
Syria’s Alawites, who have composed roughly 80-85% of every new cohort that has graduated from 
the military academy since the early 1980s.132 Though the trend of Alawite enlistment in the military 
predated both Hafez’ rise and the ascendance of the Ba’ath Party, it accelerated under his tenure, 
resulting, among other things, in the vast under-representation of Syrian Sunnis in the officer class. 
Sectarian stacking was also supplemented with a demographic component. In order to counter 
the numerical preponderance of Syria’s Sunnis, Hafez encouraged urban migration among his 
coreligionists into key strategic cities. As Fabrice Balanche notes in a report for the Washington 
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Institute for Near Policy, Hafez altered the demographic contours of Syria’s urban centers, 
engineering in the process a mixture of “divided” and “encircled” cities.133 Damascus became the 
quintessential encircled city, surrounded by a large concentration of military garrisons that could 
insulate the capital from the rest of the state in the case of an uprising.134 Moreover, in the northeast 
quarters of the overwhelmingly Sunni-inhabited city, a settlement stacked predominantly with 
Alawite SAA officers, often referred to colloquially as the “Assad suburb,” or the “army of slipper-
wearers” (a pejorative term referencing how they are perceived as uneducated ruralites),135 was 
designed to act as a coercive outpost that could potentially be mobilized against the rest of the 
population. By disproportionately appointing Alawites to positions within the military-intelligence 
complex, Hafez was able to informally partition or surround important cities with his clients, thus 
extending his power base and creating a demographic check on a potentially hostile majority.  
Although it may seem like this sectarian stacking is reflective of a broader policy intended to 
subjugate Syria’s ethnoconfessional communities, particularly its Sunnis, to Alawite hegemony, upon 
closer examination, such arrangements point to a different trend. This configuration, while reserving 
most of the elite positions to a small circle of trusted Alawites, illuminates motives that are not 
inherently sectarian, but rather, utilize communal fissures within Syrian society as an instrument 
intended to keep the armed and security forces divided. Here, leveraging intercommunal 
apprehensions serves to ensure that the cohesiveness needed to stage a coup is effectively 
compromised. Since the majority of officers are Alawite while most rank-and-file conscripts are from 
the country’s Sunni Arab majority, Hafez’ configuration was intended to exploit mistrust between the 
two communities to ensure that the former would not be able to command the support of the latter 
should they opt to stage a coup, and vice versa. This strategy was meant not simply to impede their 
chances of conducting a successful coup, but also to act as a deterrent: Given the pervasiveness of 
sectarian checks and balances and the vast penetration of informants into the SAA, the futility of 
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attempting a mutiny was designed to be such that the very notion would generally be accepted as self-
defeating, thus intuitively precluding members of the armed forces from contemplating the idea 
altogether.   
To compound this strategy, Hafez ensured that he integrated into his entourage a group of 
Sunni politicians and officers invested not just in his regime, but in him personally. The president 
“handed out key positions to his close allies, creating a circle of loyal followers to ensure control even 
in a relatively decentralized system.”136 Ba’ath party officials, for example, developed extensive ties 
with Damascus’ overwhelmingly Sunni business elite, meaning that patron-client networks forged 
under Hafez generated buy-in for those wanting to preserve their material interests. This made them 
“dependent enough upon him to render the presidency indispensable to the survival of the whole 
system.”137 The president made certain that he became synonymous with the regime itself and 
shrewdly exploited his position as the vital element through which its structure was bound together. 
Hafez “consistently saw to it that he was surrounded by well-placed Sunnis who had a direct interest 
in maintaining the government’s stability for the sake of the material privileges that they derived from 
it.”138 However, “he kept them under his thumb or watched them closely to stifle any intentions they 
might have to take power for themselves.”139 As Raymond Hinnebusch puts it, “[h]aving taken power 
through alliances with senior Sunni military officers and party politicos…Asad, initially at least, had 
to share power with them. He…deliberately co-opted prestigious Sunnis into the party and state 
machinery, and stood above and balanced between elites of different sectarian backgrounds.140 
As part of this balancing act, when Hafez became ill and had to temporarily step down from 
governing in 1983, for example, he created a six-member committee, all of whom were Sunni, to run 
the country. This maneuver was deliberately executed with the knowledge that these figures, as 
Sunnis, did not exercise control over the SAA and therefore could not conceivably envision turning 
against him without the support of the Alawite officer corps.141 Coupled with his strategy of 
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designating “trusted Alawi kinsmen and clients to key ‘coup-making units’ and the appointment of 
Alawi deputies to Sunni commanders in other units,” Hafez was able to give the regime a “parallel 
network of sectarian control,”142 and thus maintain a delicate balance of power between the sects, 
particularly Sunnis and Alawites.  
Through this system of communal checks and balances, Hafez kept the armed forces divided, 
thus ensuring that no significant threats would emanate from its ranks. Based more on perceptions of 
trust than on religious identity, the regime’s security architecture was therefore designed in order to 
cater to the ruler’s paranoia. Within the regime’s power structure, the SAA, “far from being a 
monolith, is differentiated into three distinct but overlapping groups: the Alawi security barons in 
Asad’s inner circle, Ba’athist officers, and professional officers.”143 However, since Hafez’ security 
barons were both the bedrock of his personal power base and paradoxically his main source of 
potential threats, he removed them or split their responsibilities whenever they displayed signs of 
generating personal fiefdoms.144  
These coup-proofing efforts were intensified after his younger brother, Rif’at, who 
spearheaded the 1982 Hama massacre that quelled the Muslim Brotherhood uprising, tried to stage a 
mutiny in 1984 by utilizing his own parallel forces, the Defence Companies. Considered the 
“foremost baron” of the regime at the time,145 Rif’at’s Defence Companies “had become a highly 
mobile private army 55,000 strong, with its own armour, artillery, air defence, and a fleet of troop-
carrying helicopters.”146 Indeed, “Rif’at, self-consciously the shield of his brother’s regime,” ensured 
that his men received priority when it came to equipment, funding, and salaries.147 Thus, his attempted 
coup in the aftermath of the uprising psychologically shook Hafez, reinforcing his suspicions 
regarding the ubiquitous threat of being dethroned. This had the effect of exacerbating the president’s 
paranoia. After the coup was blocked with the help of loyalist divisions,148 Hafez resorted to greater 
measures to nullify the ability of the coercive forces to function autonomously.  
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Prior to Rif’at’s putsch, the regime established praetorian guard units, elite forces with 
specialized training that functioned to preserve the president’s personal security. These units mainly 
operated as parallel militaries to be leveraged against the regular forces. In the aftermath of the 
aborted coup, Rif’at’s Defense Companies, the most important of such mobilizations, were 
disbanded, and the remaining detachments were subjected to massive reshuffling and absorbed into 
other elite mobilizations. The praetorian guard units came to comprise the Republican Guard, the 4th 
Armoured Division, and the Special Forces, which collectively constituted the only “the only troops 
authorized to set foot in the capital.”149 In 1987, an assessment issued by the CIA went as far as to 
single out Hafez’ management of Syria’s elite units as key to his hold on power: 
Syria’s elite military units, including the Special Forces, the Republican Guards, 
and, until the spring of 1984, the Defense Companies, deserve much of the credit 
for the longevity of President Hafiz al-Assad’s regime. They have prevented serious 
coup plotting and ruthlessly quashed internal dissent. Without the protection of 
these units, the Assad government probably would have long since fallen pretty to 
the internal maneuvering that brought down so many Syrian governments before 
Assad came to power in 1970…another crucial factor behind Assad’s long-lived 
regime has been his shrewd manipulation of the various power blocs within the 
Syrian officer corps – particularly the elite units charged with protecting him. He 
has deftly played potentially rival forces against each other…150   
 
Under Hafez, the Republican Guard was especially important. Formerly referred to as the 
“Presidential Guard” and initially headed by the president’s cousin and brother-in-law, Adnan 
Makhlouf, it began as a small force numbering 1,000 that was tasked with upholding the president’s 
personal security and protecting the presidential palace and visiting dignitaries.151 However, in the 
years following Rif’at’s coup, it ultimately grew to a 10,000-man mobilization that functioned both 
to protect the presidential palace and maintain security throughout central Damascus.152 According 
to the CIA, in 1985, it was the first SAA mobilization to receive T-72 M1981/3 Russian tanks, 
previously unobserved among non-Soviet forces.153 Until it was displaced in importance by the 4th 
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Division once Bashar became president, it operated as the pre-eminent praetorian unit, intended to be 
leveraged as a counterweight against all other units – and the last line of presidential defence.  
After 1984, Hafez, having survived an armed uprising by Sunni militants, at least two coup 
attempts by Alawite Jadidist officers, and a mutiny by his most trusted baron, responded by instituting 
two measures. First, after neutralizing suspected elements of each camp by conducting periodic 
purges of the coercive institutions, he elevated the SAA’s sectarianization, a process that Hicham Bou 
Nassif calls the “Alawitization of the Syrian military.”154 For example, in 1973 (three years after 
Hafez seized power), two out of the SAA’s five regular divisions were headed by Alawites, yet by 
1985, this number rose to six of nine regular divisions, and by 1992, seven of the nine regular 
divisions were led by the president’s co-religionists.155 Second, he augmented the intensification of 
sectarian stacking with a growing reliance on immediate familial bonds.  
Although Hafez’ incorporation of familial networks existed all throughout his rule,156 after 
Rif’at’s failed coup attempt, the heads of the elite divisions, which were already usually reserved for 
close Alawite associates, became exclusively entrusted to his immediate kin. Maher, Bassel, and 
Bashar, three out of Hafez’ four sons, were tasked with either heading or overseeing the command of 
the Republican Guard,157 along with the armed forces at large. In fact, in 1994, when then-head of 
the Special Forces and one of the SAA’s most skilled commanders, Major General Ali Haydar, 
objected to Hafez’s decision to recall Bashar to Syria following the death of the president’s eldest 
son, Bassel – who was originally being groomed for presidential succession – he was immediately 
relieved of his position and arrested shortly after.158 This is extremely revealing, as Haydar’s rapid 
mobilization of 10,000-15,000 “shock troops” of the Special Forces was instrumental in obstructing 
Rif’at’s coup and preserving Hafez’ presidency.159 Haydar was then replaced by General Ali Habib 
Mahmud, and the Special Forces, known for their specialized airborne assault training and rapid light 
infantry mobilization ability, were subsequently restructured and their command reduced. Hafez re-
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allocated some of the Special Forces into the 14th and 15th Divisions, which then fell under the 
purview of the 2nd and 1st Corps respectively.160 The former operated along the Lebanese border while 
the latter was oriented across the south.161 Notably, the SAA’s five elite force structures, which came 
to count the 17th Reserve Division stationed in northeastern Syria, in contrast to its conventional 
divisions, were organized to include a mixture of brigades and rapid maneuver regiments.162   
As the Republican Guard in particular has acted as parallel military unit capable of preventing 
coups, its operation under the auspices of Hafez and his sons is an illuminating demonstration of the 
paranoia that pervaded the president’s mindset and the importance of the notion of trust – to which 
only his immediate kin became deserving in the latter years of his presidency. The Alawitization of 
the SAA mentioned earlier went hand in hand with the appointment of proven loyalists, particularly 
close family members. The senior Assad was therefore, arguably, as apprehensive of potential rivals 
from his Alawite constituency as he was of the restive Sunni majority, taking measures to ensure that 
neither community could pose a credible threat to his rule.163  
The Intelligence Apparatus: A Paranoid Substructure 
Similar to the armed forces, the invasive security apparatus of the regime is heavily coup-proofed by 
design. Under Hafez, four main security agencies flourished: the General Intelligence Directorate 
(GID), the Political Security Directorate (PSD), the Military Intelligence Directorate (MID), and the 
dreaded Air Force Intelligence Directorate (AFID). On paper, the first two fall under the MoI and the 
latter two are subordinate to the MoD. In reality, however, the first two overpower the MoI and all 
four agencies nominally report to the Bureau of National Security of the Ba’ath Party.164 As part of 
the state’s security infrastructure, Syria also has military police force, a military security force, and a 
presidential security force.165 “Each of the security agencies has a head who coordinates closely with 
the president,” assert Lina Khatib and Lina Sinjab. “Each main agency, in turn, has several branches 
and sub-branches clustered around cities, towns, and villages,” with the president “defin[ing] the roles 
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of each body.”166 These institutions are often collectively referred to as the mukhabarat, Arabic for 
“intelligence agencies.” That said, the distinction between the security and intelligence agencies is 
not always clear, partially due to their secretive nature and the occasional overlap of their functions 
in practice.  
In principle, each intelligence organization has a distinct mandate.167 The GID oversees and 
commands control of the border guards, the civil police, the Ba’ath Party apparatus, the civilian 
bureaucracy, and the general populace. The PSD focuses on political intelligence and security, as 
opposed to criminal and civilian policing matters. It is further divided into Internal and External 
Security Departments, the latter formerly separated into three units: Arab Affairs, Refugee Affairs, 
and “Zionist and Jewish Affairs.” The MID monitors military officers and the military police, which 
cater to the regime’s ruling elite, and centrally safeguards the loyalty of the military as a whole. Under 
Hafez, “it was the largest intelligence agency in terms of manpower, and was allegedly responsible 
for more torture and death in Syria than any other security organization.”168 During the Syrian 
occupation of Lebanon (1976-2005), the MID also played a large role in enforcing Syria’s political 
policies under then-security chief Ghazi Kanaan.  
The notorious AFID was historically the closest to Hafez and largely led the infiltration and 
surveillance of the Syrian Air Force, hereafter referred to as the SAAF, while the Presidential Security 
Council, originally “chaired” by Hafez’ most trusted confidante, oversaw all other agencies and 
resolved minor disputes between them. However, the AFID is often considered the most powerful 
agency, containing an Investigative Branch in addition to a Special Operations Branch based in the 
Mezzeh military airport in Damascus.169 Having rose to power through the SAAF, Hafez heavily 
monitored the institution in addition to the ground forces to ensure that no commander would be 
capable of replicating the insidious process that made possible his seizure of the state. As Bou Nassif 
puts it, “Al-Asad opponents have long argued, in this regard, that the AFID and the MIS [MID] – 
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both notorious for torturing officers suspected of disloyalty to the regime – were more focused on 
quashing dissent in the armed forces than collecting data relevant to national security.”170  
In order to keep them coup-proofed, however, Hafez orchestrated a system relegating the 
intelligence institutions into competing organizations, each of which was prohibited from 
independently communicating with the others. Instead, its heads reported directly to him. He did this 
largely by conducting outgoing phone calls, deliberately accepting incoming calls from “only a 
handful of people, perhaps no more than three or four security chiefs, [who] had the right to ring 
him.”171 As opposed to coordinating and pooling information, they essentially constituted disjointed 
and “rival institutions, as is usual under paranoid governments.”172 As Khatib and Sinjab put it, 
“originally conceived by Hafez al-Assad, this power structure was designed so that the agencies 
monitored not only the public but also each other, the aim being to keep the balance of power in the 
hands of the president.”173 Consisting of a chain of command carefully selected from ardent loyalists, 
though dominated by Alawites, appointments were based on nepotism, favouritism, and familial 
relations – not merit. Indeed, proven ability, experience, and professionalism were less consequential 
in the selection process than their perceived allegiance.  
In reality, it is difficult to ascertain with absolute precision the demarcation line between these 
organizations. Though the breakdown outlined above is commonly regarded as true, their authority, 
in practice, often overlaps. Moreover, the mukhabarat’s ubiquitous tentacles meant that, under Hafez, 
collaborators could be found within virtually every formal state institution.174 The fact that the 
intelligence apparatus maintained an army of informants to spy on the SAA was an open secret: While 
exact numbers are difficult to confirm, the degree to which they penetrated its ranks prevented 
personnel from trusting one another, thereby lowering the prospect of organized armed dissent. 
Everyone was a potential agent, especially as the Ba’ath Party, too, was transformed “into an adjunct 
to the security apparatus…tasked with spying on the sectors of society from which ideational 
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challenges to the regime could occur.”175 Due to the disproportionately high ratio of Alawites in the 
intelligence agencies and the tendency for the regime to utilize state sector employees, cab drivers, 
and university faculty to spy on the population, the minority community was often thought to be an 
incubator for mukhabarat operatives working under cover. This is hardly unusual given that, by “the 
early 1990s, conservative estimates put the number of people working for different intelligence 
organizations in Syria at 50,000; other conjectures maintained that the number was three times 
higher.”176 These perceptions deeply exaggerated reality, however, by overstating the average 
Alawite’s relationship to the regime in general and the intelligence agencies in particular, whose spies 
were recruited from across Syria’s communal landscape.  
Like Father, Like Son? Bashar’s Coup-Proofing Infrastructure 
Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000 upon inheriting his father’s presidency, a practice that is 
commonplace in authoritarian regimes. After Bashar took office, he continued many of the polices 
instituted by his father, to which coup-proofing was no exception. His inheritance therefore also 
entailed an adoption of the divide-and-rule framework utilized by Hafez vis-à-vis the armed and 
security forces, the structures and mechanisms of which were leveraged to institutionally neutralize 
their attempt to launch coordinated mutinies. To illustrate this point, a report by the intelligence 
agency Stratfor, published at the outset of the 2011 uprising in Syria, described the following: 
Syrian Alawites are stacked in the military from both the top and the bottom, 
keeping the army’s mostly Sunni 2nd Division commanders in check. Of the 
200,000 career soldiers in the Syrian army, roughly 70 percent are Alawites. Some 
80 percent of officers in the army are also believed to be Alawites. The military’s 
most elite division, the Republican Guard, led by the President’s younger brother 
Maher al Assad, is an all-Alawite force. Syria’s ground forces are organized in three 
corps (consisting of combined artillery, armor and mechanized infantry units). Two 
corps are led by Alawites. Most of Syria’s 300,00 conscripts are Sunnis …Even 
though most of Syria’s air force pilots are Sunnis, most ground support crews are 
Alawites who control logistics, telecommunications, and maintenance, thereby 
preventing potential Sunni air force dissenters from acting unilaterally. Syria’s air 
force intelligence, dominated by Alawites, is one of the strongest intelligence 
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agencies within the security apparatus and has a core function of ensuring that Sunni 
pilots do not rebel against the regime.177 
 
The Republican Guard, contrary to what is stated, did indeed contain some Sunni officers at the time 
of the Stratfor publication, many of whom shared links to the regime’s elite. Nevertheless, the passage 
is revealing. While the structures and mechanisms set up by Hafez remained relatively intact, Bashar 
slightly modified his father’s strategies. Distrustful of the old guard to which the military belonged – 
possibly due to his privileged civilian upbringing and suspicion that many others shared Ali Haydar’s 
opposition to presidential succession – he sidelined the SAA as an institution. In its place, he preferred 
to disproportionately rely on the praetorian guard units and the intelligence apparatus, even more so 
than the elder Assad.178 Under both father and son, the armed forces – save for the elite divisions – 
had broadly been considered weak, inept, underfunded, and politically marginalized.179 However, 
“Bashar saw the army as less reliable than it had been under Hafiz, whose authority had been 
unquestioned; the regime’s alliance with it weakened and its morale declined as its funding dropped, 
its enrichment activities in Lebanon were lost after 2005, and its arms and equipment fell far behind 
those of Israel.”180 As a result, opportunities for advancement within the SAA diminished.  
Bashar inherited not just the police state left by his father, but the vast patron-client networks 
that he had developed.181 However, as opposed to Hafez, he overwhelmingly retrenched these 
clientelist supply chains, enabling elements of his familial entourage to monopolize the means of 
corruption. In 2005, Bashar shuffled Ba’ath Party leadership at the 10th Syrian Party Congress in order 
to make way for a project to liberalize the economy,182 an endeavor that ushered in a new era of crony 
capitalism of which the largest benefactors were members of his extended family.183 Together, these 
maneuvers had the effect of “entrenching patronage, opportunities, and corruption in its hands at the 
expense of other regime clients” and “narrow[ing] loyalties from party to family core, a bad move for 
authoritarian structures.”184 The partial erosion of Hafez’ network due to Bashar’s ‘liberal’ reforms 
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entailed a greater focus of wealth in the hands of his inner circle, including his cousin, notorious 
oligarch Rami Makhlouf, who came to dominate over 60% of the Syrian economy.185 The top tier of 
the coercive establishment, dominated by the extended Assad-Makhlouf-Shalish clans with which the 
president shared familial bonds, expanded its riches as it was permitted to muscle in on the economic 
transition away from ‘state socialism,’ thus intertwining the security and financial elite.186 Many 
elements of the former simply exploited their status to reposition themselves as the oligarchs of the 
new order. By restructuring the economy, he limited the avenues for illicit income that had benefited 
a swath of actors under the previous system, which had been relatively decentralized in this regard. 
 The new president’s campaign to sideline the SAA and push out elements of the old guard, 
combined with growing economic inequality, had the effect of disgruntling the majority of its 
personnel. Since Bashar had preferred to shuffle around officers who once kept their positions 
indefinitely under Hafez,187 many chose not to kick down their profits from illicit activities. They 
instead sought to accumulate as much material wealth – as rapidly as possible – during their tenure 
in office. According to a 2011 report by the International Crisis Group: 
The young president removed key figures who operated with a high degree of 
autonomy under Hafez and had run mafia-style empires, accumulating personal 
wealth but also doling it out to lower-ranking officers to purchase their loyalty. The 
new appointees act differently; they hold their jobs for shorter periods, seek quick 
personal enrichment and thus no longer see any point in redistributing their ill-
begotten wealth.188  
 
In 2009, Bashar encroached on their illicit sources of income with the launch of an “anti-corruption” 
campaign. The campaign’s timing was telling: it occurred one year after the president reshuffled his 
officers189 due to a claim by his brother, Maher, to have discovered a coup plot.190 Since Bashar’s 
anti-corruption operations disproportionately targeted the military, including, on occasion, some 
elements of its junior officer class – while exempting senior officials regarded as close to the Assad 
family to whom the informal economy circled back – the SAA lost strength, cohesiveness, and 
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morale, especially as those investigating corruption realized that their efforts had been pointless given 
its systemic prevalence throughout coercive and judicial institutions.191 The inconsistencies of such 
campaigns, which were viewed as theatrical by most, caused resentment, especially among junior 
officers, whose salaries were far less than members of the top brass. Additionally, they lacked access 
to the types of lucrative profits accrued from smuggling – often in conjunction with shabiha 
smuggling cartels linked to the Assad clan and high-ranking intelligence officers – and oil rents that 
enriched members of the elite units who had shared close linkages to the Assad family.192 Often, “[t]o 
compensate, the regime turned a blind eye when mid-ranking and junior officers took bribes in 
exchange of granting soldiers rights to leave, or engaged in different kinds of petty extortion.”193  
The military and security apparatus fashioned by Hafez and slightly altered by Bashar attracted 
career personnel for reasons that had little to do with the institutions themselves. Rather, they 
primarily sought the privileges associated with higher positions even though corruption was 
nevertheless endemic. A defected major from the Syrian Air Defense provides a revealing testimony 
regarding the pervasive and systemic nature of corruption within the SAA: 
Combat preparedness is good when 80 per cent of a company’s heavy weaponry 
(tanks, artillery, and military transport) is operational. Military inspectors on tours 
have often found that less than 40 per cent of the equipment is properly maintained. 
Yet they wrote reports stating otherwise, in exchange for bribes they get from 
military commanders who want their companies to look sharp on paper. The 
corruption of military inspectors is one of the worst-kept secrets in the armed forces. 
Alawi senior officers must know about the practice. But they don’t do much to stop 
it because they benefit from it, and also, because they don’t care.194  
 
In fact, in 2008, a study published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies calculated that 
of the 4,950 battle tanks and 4,500 armoured personnel carriers (APC) and infantry fighting vehicles 
(IFV) reportedly in the regime’s possession, close to half of the tanks and most APC and IFV fleet 
were considered outdated.195 Lots of equipment was believed to be operationally limited.196 
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Meanwhile, similar to his father, Bashar staffed many of his top political and diplomatic 
positions with Sunnis in order to reinforce rivalry between the Alawite-dominated coercive forces 
and Sunni political class. This was intended to keep both groups perpetually distrustful of one another 
given where each was situated within the regime’s informal sectarian structure. As a result of the 
growing economic gap between the different strata of the coercive forces under Bashar, merit fell 
even more as a factor motivating enlistment and promotions. Moreover, not only had the “all-in-the-
family tactics indeed remained a feature of the Syrian military under Bashar,” the armed and security 
forces underwent even greater sectarianization.197 By 2011, of the 12 regular divisions comprising 
the SAA, only the 7th and 10th Divisions had Sunni commanders, the rest of which were headed by 
Alawite generals.198 Manaf Tlass – a Sunni who, up until his defection in 2012 was a brigadier general 
of the Republican Guard, son of the former defence minister under Hafez, and close personal friend 
of Bashar – estimated that out of Syria’s 40,000 officers, 30,000 had been Alawite at the time of his 
split from the regime.199 Moreover, Maher, acting on his brother’s behalf, was thought to have 
become the de facto operational commander of the SAA, effectively leading both the 4th Armored 
Division200 and the Republican Guard.201 At the uprising’s outset, Syria’s coercive forces had been 
fraught with dysfunction.  
 In Syria, the coup-proofing apparatus presided over by Assad produced dysfunctional armed 
and security forces. By prioritizing coup risk mitigation over military effectiveness, he impaired the 
ability of his coercive institutions to function cohesively and autonomously. The utilization of 
counterbalancing and the exploitation of sectarian and familial bonds often reinforced one another in 
a manner that demoralized personnel not aligned to the networks of power within the top tiers of the 
officer corps. Against this backdrop, the tacit sanctioning of widespread corruption forged 
institutional landscapes beset with a host of detrimental practices, often molding officers concerned 
more with exploiting their positions for financial gain than with reasons related to professionalism. 
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Since the regime’s elite valued allegiance over proven ability, they tolerated corrosive levels of 
corruption and installed their cronies across institutions. The following chapter demonstrates how 
coup-proofing undercut the effectiveness of the SAA within the context of the Syrian conflict, helping 
to set in motion a vicious cycle that eroded its ability to implement an effective COIN campaign. The 
resulting feedback loop caused Assad to turn to PGMs and other exogenous security actors in order 



































CHAPTER 4 – REGIME INSECURITY AND THE EMERGENCE 
OF PGMS  
 
INTRODUCTION: 
This chapter examines the context in which PGMs emerged in post-2011 Syria. Building off the 
previous chapter, it showcases the role that coup-proofing mechanisms played in helping to generate 
a detrimental feedback loop that contributed to the progressive unravelling of the coercive forces as 
the conflict unfolded. Though repression and discrimination served as a catalyst for greater anti-
regime mobilization from the Syrian populace, sectarian stacking and corruption helped expedite the 
erosion of security forces by contributing to defections and desertions. Moreover, counterbalancing 
meant that once the uprisings had militarized, the Syrian president was forced to disproportionately 
rely on ‘trusted’ elite units with specialized training as opposed to the largely neglected regular SAA. 
These units became overstretched and suffered considerable losses as the insurgencies intensified. 
Amid the vacuum of security that followed the militarization of the uprising, this chapter develops a 
timeline that establishes how regime insecurity prompted Assad to outsource security processes to 
PGMs and other exogenous actors in order to compensate for the dissipation of his coercive forces.  
A VICIOUS CYCLE: COUP-PROOFING, INSECURITY, AND THE SYRIAN 
COIN CAMPAIGN:  
In the post-2011 Syrian conflict, coup-proofing and regime insecurity reinforced one another in a 
feedback loop that eroded the regime’s ability to implement an effective COIN campaign. The 
utilization of sectarian stacking positioned Alawites as disproportionate stakeholders in upholding 
regime security while providing alienated Sunnis with less incentive to remain invested in the status 
quo. This accelerated the attrition of the coercive forces, as the regime’s elite was forced to rely 
mostly on its Alawite constituency. Moreover, counterbalancing meant that the more the regular SAA 
faltered, the more the elite units were needed to compensate for their erosion. However, the more they 
were used in lieu of the regular divisions, the more they decayed, and the more vulnerable the Syrian 
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leadership became. Similarly, the detrimental implications brought on by corrupt practices within the 
coercive forces helped weaken the SAA’s military positions. Yet as the insurgency expanded, so too 
did the avenues for illicit self-enrichment among the coercive forces, many of whom exploited the 
vacuum of security to accrue profits. This is explored below. 
How Coup-proofing Set in Motion a Vicious Cycle that Eroded the SAA 
In Syria, sectarian stacking, counterbalancing, and corruption, all of which were deeply ingrained into 
the Assad regime’s coup-proofing machinations, significantly contributed to the decay of the SAA 
throughout the conflict. Sectarian stacking alienated Sunni personnel, prompting their defection and 
desertion as rebellious regions populated primarily by Sunnis were violently subdued by an 
amalgamation of elite units, shabiha irregulars, and mukhabarat officers consisting largely of trusted 
Alawites operating at the directive of members of the president’s extended family. The more Sunnis 
split from the regime, the more it became dependent on ‘loyalist’ units with high Alawite 
composition, leading to the attrition of the elite mobilizations and the exhaustion of the Alawite 
community at large, the latter ultimately going to great lengths to avoid forced conscription. 
Meanwhile, corrupt practices – long permitted by the regime to secure the allegiance of the officer 
corps – boomed as the conflict protracted, enabling a culture of self-interested opportunism in which 
officers exploited their positions for self-enrichment, even when it came at the cost of the state’s 
COIN effort and the survival of the regime to which their privileges were tied. Ultimately, the legacies 
of coup-proofing helped set in motion a feedback loop, interacting with regime insecurity in a manner 
that undermined the SAA’s COIN capacity. These dysfunctional dynamics are explored below.  
Sectarian stacking significantly undermined the SAA’s cohesion throughout the conflict. 
First, sectarianism as a coup-proofing tool led to the broad demoralization of Sunni personnel. 
Although Syria’s Sunnis did enjoy a certain degree of official representation in the military, social 
stratification within the SAA institutionalized an informal sectarian hierarchy in which Alawites often 
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received greater opportunities relative to their Sunni counterparts. Since Sunnis had far fewer 
financial privileges than the predominantly Alawite security elite, they had less incentive to remain 
loyal.202 Though this was particularly true of rank-and-rile conscripts – who made up the majority of 
SAA personnel and whose conditions were generally miserable regardless of confessional affiliation 
– it also applied to many junior and intermediate Sunni officers. Their lack of prestige compared to 
their Alawite superiors – and in some cases, deputies – alienated them. Therefore, as the regime 
escalated repression against Sunni areas in order to quell the uprising, Sunni troops suffered from a 
loss of morale as their co-religionists came under fire by an organized and repressive force drawn 
heavily from Alawites linked to, or mobilized by, the top echelons of the state’s military-intelligence 
complex.203  
In December 2011, the European Union (EU), citing violence against demonstrators, 
sanctioned seven of fourteen members of the Assad-Makhlouf-Shalish families who were also among 
the top commanders in the state’s coercive apparatus.204 That same month, in a report published by 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), defectors, the majority of whom were “low-level conscripts,” 
attributed their split from the regime’s ranks directly to their moral objection against killing largely 
unarmed protestors.205 Their testimonies pointed to the culpability of a series of elite division 
commanders, the highest of whom was Maher al-Assad.206 Moreover, they stated that in many cases, 
the SAA was accompanied by the shabiha, which were mobilized into a clandestine militia force by 
Assad’s cousins207 and deployed across the governorates of Daraa, Damascus, Deir Ezzor, Idlib, 
Hama, Homs, Latakia, and Tartous.208 Along with intelligence officers – key among them those 
within the AFID’s Special Operations Unit – they reportedly shot troops who objected to violently 
quelling protestors, while engaging in arbitrary violence and widespread looting against civilian 
populations.209 Notably, the crackdown against protestors, even in confessionally mixed towns, took 
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place primarily in Sunni districts, meaning that the recipients of state violence were mostly Sunni. In 
response to the regime’s utilization of familial and confessional bonds to subdue a predominantly 
Sunni-populated uprising, the military began “bleeding Sunnis who did not want to take part in the 
killing of Sunni civilians anywhere in Syria, let alone in their own towns and villages.”210 The decline 
in allegiance of the SAA’s Sunnis was compounded by the fact that most of them had roots in the 
countryside, where “parochial relations and identification remain strong.”211 When forced to choose 
between allegiance to a repressive regime characterized by Alawite hegemony and their own 
communities, many chose the latter. 
As a result of their disenfranchisement within the SAA, Sunnis came to overwhelmingly 
populate the ranks of the myriad rebel groups. Prior to absorbing large numbers of civilian recruits, 
armed opposition factions were initially led by defected soldiers and officers. As Bou Nassif points 
out, broadly speaking, “defection remained a Sunni phenomenon; very few non-Sunnis joined the 
[armed] uprising.”212 This dynamic culminated in the defection of up to 3,000 Sunni officers by 
2014,213 which, according to the testimonies of defected soldiers, represented half of Syria’s overall 
number of Sunni officers.214 A recent study conducted by the Global Public Policy Institute 
underscores a similar trend in the SAAF.215 Of the 165 pilots who defected from the SAAF between 
2011 and 2015, with the exception of one, all had been identified as Sunni.216 Moreover, just two 
years into the conflict, the overwhelmingly Sunni Free Syrian Army (FSA) – an umbrella rebel 
organization under which ostensibly moderate anti-government militants came to operate – claimed 
to have established a network of sympathetic informants within the SAA.217 Sectarian stacking thus 
effected the coercive forces’ precipitous fracture along such lines, driving Sunni personnel to defect 
or desert in large numbers.  
Second, since Sunnis composed the majority of SAA personnel, the gap in coercive means 
left by their absence led to substantial manpower shortages. In a vicious cycle, the more defections 
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grew, the more Sunnis were treated as a fifth column for the armed opposition. The greater their 
alienation, however, the more likely they were, in turn, to abandon the regime. Many defected Sunni 
officers revealed that, prior to their split from the SAA, they experienced persecution and grew to 
worry that false denunciations of disloyalty would elicit punitive measures against them.218 By mid-
2012, the regime was estimated to have killed thousands of soldiers attempting to flee, in addition to 
imprisoning approximately 2,500 officers and lower-ranking personnel in the notorious Seidnaya 
prison, north of Damascus.219 According to opposition sources, the compound was emptied of 
political prisoners to make room for military staff-turned-inmates.220 Growing defection and desertion 
rates also dissuaded the regime from dispatching Sunni personnel, thereby further exacerbating these 
shortages.221 Owing to the Alawite-dominated security elite’s increasing hesitation to rely on Sunni 
personnel for fear that they would defect, the number of deployable units shrank as the insurgency 
dragged on. A 2013 report by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) captures this well: 
Bashar al-Assad’s reliance on a small core of trusted military units limited his 
ability to control all of Syria. He hedged against defections by deploying only the 
most loyal one-third of the Syrian Army, but in so doing he undercut his ability to 
prosecute a troop-intensive counterinsurgency campaign because he could not use 
all of his forces. Defections and attrition have exacerbated the regime’s central 
challenge of generating combat power.222  
 
The mutually reinforcing dynamics of Sunni alienation and sectarian reservations among the security 
elite therefore had the effect of aggravating the quantitative dilapidation of the SAA, as it lowered 
the regime’s reservoir of dispatchable troops. This was made worse by the fact that capable Sunni 
personnel were isolated from the regime’s COIN campaign. In response to the earlier waves of 
defections, a number of career Sunni officers that were in charge of commanding infantry brigades 
were reshuffled by the regime and assigned administrative positions with “little to no direct contact 
with soldiers.”223  
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As defections and desertions grew, so too did the regime’s propensity to depend strictly on 
‘trusted’ units. The disinclination to rely on Sunni personnel due to concerns regarding political 
loyalty exhausted so-called loyalist elements within the SAA while accelerating battlefield losses. 
The regime’s reluctance to trust many of its Sunni troops with manning checkpoints or deploying to 
active frontlines,224 particularly in urban settings, meant that it was forced to instead depend on units 
with high Alawite composition. As a result, armoured divisions operated by trusted personnel were 
often dispatched to rebellious zones in counteroffensives without infantry reinforcements, only to be 
ambushed and outmaneuvered by the urban guerrilla tactics employed by the rebels.225 By the time 
PGMs like the NDF had growingly featured as infantry support in counteroffensive operations 
alongside armoured divisions in 2013, the military had lost no fewer than 1,800 T-55, T-62, and T-
72 tanks and BMP units – some of which were seized by the rebels – collectively amounting to 25% 
of the regime’s armoured vehicular arsenal.226 Here, maintenance issues, compounded by the corrupt 
inspection process mentioned in Chapter 3, played a role as well.  
The overreliance on elite units, which were also inordinately stacked with Alawites, led to 
their attrition. This is because, as the most capable mobilizations, they were disproportionately 
deployed in combat operations, particularly as the conflict intensified. Having received the most 
robust military preparation, funding, and equipment, they were needed to compensate for the ill-
equipped and ill-trained personnel of the SAA’s regular divisions, who lacked the logistical capacity 
to perform combatively. Thus, the 4th Armoured Division, Special Forces, and Republican Guard, 
alongside key elements of the 14th, 15th, and 17th Division, were all made to play an “unsustainably 
heavy role in fighting on the conflict’s main frontlines since mid-2011,” as they scrambled to put 
down insurgent operations across the country.227 In order to reinforce the regime’s  COIN campaign, 
these elite units decentralized their structure by dividing their command and dispersing their 
formations across the SAA’s inadequate regular divisions.228 However, this placed them in unfamiliar 
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terrain outside their traditional territorial theatres of operations. For example, the Republican Guard, 
which was designed to operate in Damascus and its vicinity, had by 2013 been active on multiple 
fronts spanning three governorates.229 By 2015, its regiments were active in five separate 
governorates.230  
Though this adaptive strategy kept the regime’s COIN effort somewhat loosely intact, it also 
led to the institutional decay of the elite units. In a 2019 study published by the Middle East Institute 
on the degradation of the SAA over the course of the conflict, elite units were shown to have incurred 
significant losses.231 Not only had certain Special Forces regiments been destroyed or demobilized in 
their entirety, the 4th Division had lost many of its most effective officers, “leaving inexperienced 
commanders in charge of low-quality recruits.”232 The decay of the 4th Division is particularly 
revealing, as it had become the principal praetorian mobilization under Maher’s command, 
functioning  as “Bashar al-Assad’s indispensable elite unit.”233 The dependence on trusted elements 
of the armed and security forces deepened as defections and desertions rose, prompting the regime to 
mobilize intelligence agencies such as AFID to deploy personnel in an urban combat capacity to 
compensate for military decomposition.234   
 Third, sectarian distrust at times forged conditions in which Sunni personnel could abandon 
their posts. Since the security elite growingly came to distrust Sunni soldiers after the initial round of 
military defections, they often confined them to isolated barracks and outposts in rural areas.235 Yet 
as the regime progressively atrophied, however, it prioritized holding urban centres at the expense of 
the countryside, paradoxically making it easier for these troops to split from its ranks. Thus, unlike 
many of their Alawite, Christian, and Druze counterparts, whose defection carried the risk of sectarian 
reprisals from anti-government forces, many Sunnis abandoned the regime the first chance they 
received.236 Defections and desertions grew as a result, particularly as insurgents calibrated their 
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guerrilla offensives to target neglected bases in the countryside. Operations targeting these garrisons 
also led to a surge in captured weapons caches among different rebel factions. Rooted in sectarian 
factors, the splintering of the SAA set off a chain of events, reinforced in a feedback loop, that 
weakened the regime’s COIN campaign. 
Yet, not only had the sectarianized structure of the SAA helped trigger Sunni splintering and 
lead the regime to intensify its dependence on trusted units, it also encouraged it to disproportionately 
target the Alawite community for conscription to compensate for manpower shortages. However, as 
casualties multiplied among the poorly performing SAA, the conflation of mandatory military service 
with death soared, causing panic among the Alawites, whose inflated association with the regime’s 
repressive apparatus instilled in the community a fear that the rebel seizure of the state would lead to 
their widescale slaughter. This fear grew as the opposition gradually radicalized. In the fall of 2012, 
in response to rising SAA fatalities, a campaign by members of the Alawite community crystalized 
that called for rejecting conscription.237 By the spring of 2015, Alawites, growing numbers of whom 
had been fleeing the country for years to avoid the implications of the draft,238 began actively resisting 
deployment outside of their respective regions. Though many Alawites came to enlist in offensively 
oriented PGMs in order to collect higher salaries, demoralization meant that large segments of the 
community went to great lengths to avoid being dispatched to distant battlefields in ‘defence’ of Sunni 
areas they considered foreign and thus not worth salvaging. Ultimately, the community played a 
disproportionate role in militarily preserving the regime due to apprehensions over an increasingly 
intolerant opposition, yet those who possessed the means avoided the frontlines whenever possible. 
In addition to sectarian-centered factors, systemic corruption gave rise to practices that 
weakened the SAA’s positions while facilitating the advance of the rebels. The pervasive culture of 
corruption within the coercive forces had institutionally normalized a range of unlawful and illicit 
practices over a course of generations. As such, once the uprising had militarized, corrupt officers 
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instinctively sought to capitalize on the security context for financial aggrandizement. The well-
established rent-generating practice among officers of accepting fees in exchange for permitting 
personnel absenteeism became widespread. Officers routinely solicited bribes from their subordinates 
that permitted conscripts to forgo military service or be stationed to specific areas deemed safer than 
others.239 Naturally, as the demand increased owing to the desire among troops to avoid the mounting 
levels of violence associated with the conflict, so too did the rewards from such transactions.  
Augmenting these conventional sources of petty profiteering, moreover, were the new 
avenues for illicit self-enrichment made strictly possible by the conflict. Corrupt officers sold arms 
to the opposition, exploiting the vacuum of security that occurred in order to turn a profit.240 This 
trend became widespread. For example, in June 2012, a member of the FSA’s Suqour al-Sham faction 
in Jabal al-Zawiya informed a reporter that roughly 40% of his formation’s armaments and 
ammunition were acquired through deals made with crooked regime officers.241 Officers also rented 
out checkpoints to private individuals and sold re-captured land back to the rebels.242 Even as the 
balance of power shifted and the regime visibly faced strain, corrupt rituals continued unabated. 
Together, these practices undermined the regime’s ability to hold positions while also making it easier 
for soldiers to defect, desert, and flee the country to avoid conscription. Additionally, kidnappings-
for-ransom, another lucrative business that boomed under the fog of war, fueled forced 
disappearances at checkpoints manned by intelligence officers and the shabiha.243 This further eroded 
faith in the regime and its security forces, including among its own personnel, many of whom were 
likely motivated to split from its ranks as the unhinged corruption they witnessed starkly contradicted 
the romantic framing of the regime’s security effort depicted on state media.  
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The remainder of this chapter explores the context in which PGMs emerged in Syria, 
illustrating how the Assad regime faced mounting levels of insecurity when it chose to formally 
incorporate these actors into its COIN efforts. 
REGIME INSECURITY  
Phase One (2011-2012): Defections and Rebellion Amid Security Force Repression 
In Syria, protests began evolving into an armed insurgency sometime between the spring and summer 
of 2011 in response to security force repression. Initially deployed under the pretext that they were 
combating armed “terrorists” and “Salafists” seeking to topple the state and foment chaos, rank-and-
file troops and junior officers followed orders, at times aiding and abetting the regime’s campaign of 
violence. Soldiers were reportedly given shoot-to-kill orders, often issued by their commanders, who, 
as previously mentioned, were instructed to do so by their superiors, as well as by trusted mukhabarat 
officers and shabiha irregulars.244 Through extreme force, the regime sought to subdue public 
displays of civil disobedience in order to preclude the emergence of a zone occupied by protestors, 
similar to Tahrir Square in Egypt.245  
Yet the situation changed after many of these soldiers began to see evidence contradicting the 
regime’s narrative regarding the unfolding events. As a result, from April to August 2011, the regime 
experienced its first discernible wave of military defections. Some accounts suggest that elements of 
the SAA’s 5th Division, a largely Sunni division that had been historically stationed in southern Syria, 
began clashing with Maher’s forces as early as the siege of Daraa – then the epicenter of the uprising 
– in late April.246 Spearheaded by Maher, the assault on Daraa saw 4th Division personnel violently 
storm the city with tanks, helicopters, and snipers, trapping 15,000 civilians inside, many of whom 
were either abused or arbitrarily detained.247 Defections and desertions multiplied throughout the 
summer as the template used to quell unrest in Daraa was replicated across multiple restive areas, 
increasingly prompting troops to defy orders and abandon the regime. Pitched battles between the 
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security forces and an armed insurgent movement, while still in its infancy, became more frequent in 
response to the regime’s brutal crackdown. 
 By the summer of 2011, an armed rebellion had begun to take form alongside continued civic 
activism as defectors, the vast majority of whom were Sunni, split from the SAA in response to the 
regime’s ignominious use of repression. In June, in the northern town of Jisr al-Shughour, troops who 
disobeyed orders to shoot at rioters were killed by intelligence officers, prompting a “watershed 
moment” in the conflict: the first case of mass defection.248 This was followed by the first large-scale 
attack against the SAA, as the defected contingent successfully ambushed a military convoy 
dispatched to pursue it. 120 soldiers were killed as helicopters and tanks, believed to be led by Maher, 
were deployed to stamp out the defectors.249 Though defections had been reported in Tal Kalakh in 
Homs and in sites across the governorate of Daraa, this was the largest escalation yet.250 Within days 
of the events, Lieutenant Colonel Hussein Harmoush of the SAA’s 11th Armored Division251 held his 
military identification card to the camera and, citing the protection of protestors, announced his 
defection “in what became a paradigm of a thousand similar videos.”252 Six weeks later, a number of 
defected SAA officers, commanded by Colonel Riad al-Assad, declared the formation of the FSA 
from Turkey.253 From this point on, protests emerged alongside a growingly organized armed 
opposition. 
Within months of the first protests, the Assad regime had already faced challenges to its 
longevity, as its coercive machinery displayed its first signs of unravelling. Liberal calculations at 
this stage of the insurgency placed military defections and desertions in the tens of thousands.254 
Rural Idlib, most notably in the Jabal al-Zawiya region located between the industrial center in Aleppo 
and the ‘loyalist’ stronghold of Latakia, became a meeting point for defectors-turned-rebels. 
“Defectors also gathered in the towns and villages of the Homs countryside, demonstrating the extent 
of the collapse of the old Baathist cross-sect alliance, for this was a rural Sunni constituency…and 
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was still a traditional military recruiting ground, perhaps the country’s primary source of Sunni 
officers.”255 For example, the town of Rastan in Homs, previously a bastion of  Sunni support for the 
Assad regime that included the high-profile Tlass family, became the “first city to resist the regime 
with organized, armed opposition in September 2011.”256  
Since defections and desertions mushroomed across the country, loyalist forces were 
dispatched to multiple theaters in an attempt to quell an armed rebellion that had begun inflicting 
damages on the security forces. Already by August, the Syrian Violations Documentation Center – 
an NGO founded and run by Syrian citizen-activists – reported that security force casualties reached 
as high as 500.257 Moreover, defectors-turned-rebels, while most prominent in the countryside, 
nevertheless proliferated in several suburban pockets across the country. For example, by October, 
the SAA had reportedly deployed 250 tanks and other armoured vehicles to Rastan in pursuit of over 
2,000 military defectors operating in Syria’s northern countryside.258  
That same month, its forces were dispersed all the way to Al Bukamal on the Iraqi border, 
while defections reached areas in suburban Damascus such as al-Ghouta.259 This placed armed 
contenders within range of the city centre. While multiple other examples exist, what matters is that 
the SAA had preliminarily struggled to counter an insurgent movement, whose expansion was 
outpacing the regime’s attempts to subdue it. Additionally, al-As’ad stated from Turkey that he 
commanded a force of 15,000 rebels in Syria under the banner of the FSA with whom he had been 
coordinating.260 Potential exaggerations notwithstanding, the integrity of the regime’s coercive 
institutions, chiefly the army, had begun to erode in tandem with the emergence of a growing 
rebellion. These dynamics – defections, desertions, insurgent gains, and military casualties – 
significantly accelerated throughout 2012. The following section explores this further. 
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Phase Two (2012-2013): An Eroding SAA is Challenged by An Evolving Insurgency  
Throughout 2012, the insurgency expanded, as did the regime’s inability to militarily halt its 
momentum. As a result of a combination of SAA dynamics mentioned earlier in this chapter – low 
logistical capacity, corruption, the rural roots of Sunni officers, and the placement of Sunni personnel 
in isolated rural barracks – a political geography of armed rebellion crystalized in Syria’s countryside. 
This stretched from rural Idlib in the north to the town of Zabadani in the south, with Homs and the 
Qalamoun mountains northeast of the capital serving as a source of transit that facilitated the mobility 
of anti-government forces.261 The Qalamoun mountains, which separate Syria from one of its several 
porous borderlands with Lebanon, acted as conduit that created a north-south axis of insurgent control 
over a non-contiguous, but proximate, constellation of villages and towns scattered in the countryside. 
Zabadani, situated along the Damascus-Beirut highway just 10 km away from the Lebanese border 
and 50 km away from metropolitan Damascus, was captured in full by the rebels in January,262 who 
boasted that it was one of three dozen areas to have fallen to them.263 Weeks later, they drove security 
forces out of Rastan and established full control.264 However, they later withdrew to avoid the type 
of indiscriminate shelling to which the SAA had increasingly resorted in light of its inability to 
simultaneously dispatch personnel to multiple arenas due to intensifying manpower shortages.265 In 
Homs City, the regime was facing stiff resistance from an insurgency that had occupied large parts 
of the Sunni neighbourhoods of Baba Amr and al-Khalidyeh.266 
In the months that followed, an “urban-rural stalemate” ensued in which the regime growingly 
prioritized holding cities as opposed to engaging rebels into the countryside, where they had been 
enjoying far greater success.267 In fact, between January and April 2012, guerrilla raids against regime 
positions more than doubled, while the effective application of roadside bombs increased to nearly 
100%.268 In rural areas, the rebels, through a combination of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 
hit-and-run operations, border post assaults, and tactical sieges of airfields, had pressured the regime 
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to retreat from territory over which military control was deemed too costly to maintain.269 This 
exhausted Syrian security forces, whose broad lack of professional military preparedness made them 
ill-equipped to deal with the nature of conventional warfare, let alone these asymmetrical tactics. 
Even in areas as strategically significant as the Alawite stronghold of rural Latakia, Sunni insurgent 
pockets had destroyed a number of armoured vehicles and inflicted heavy casualties on SAA 
personnel throughout the spring, prompting the regime to use helicopter gunships to make up for a 
depletion of its reservoir of dispatchable military units.270 The incapacity to contain the insurgency, 
even in vital loyalist territories, was a clear testament to the growing dissipation of the regime’s COIN 
efforts. 
The demoralization of Syrian security forces soared as casualties and defections increased in 
response to growing rebel successes. This encouraged the regime to continue escalating repression to 
countervail its loss of personnel. “Throughout 2011, the regime relied on selective brutality,” a 2012 
report by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) asserted, “but in 2012, it decided that the cost of 
retaking terrain with maneuver forces alone would be too high. Rather than isolate a rebel stronghold 
and clear the area of opposition, the regime stayed on the periphery and used indiscriminate shelling 
to force the opposition to capitulate.”271 The capacity to implement the “clear-and-hold” component 
of COIN operations progressively dwindled as the regular forces eroded.  
The SAA’s inability to retain territorial control in its rural and peripheral regions, home to 
most of its discontented Sunni personnel, also had the consequence of exacerbating its capacity to 
consolidate control of urban terrain, as the loss of the countryside made it easier for rebels to encircle 
and penetrate cities. For example, regime withdrawal from key positions in Syria’s northeastern 
countryside throughout the spring, such as in Deir Ezzor, made possible the gradual seizure by 
insurgents of urban areas across the governorate. By April, virtually all of Deir Ezzor’s countryside 
had been in the hands of insurgents, while control of Deir Ezzor City itself became contested with 
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Syrian security forces.272 Its Muhassen neighbourhood, previously described as a “reservoir of Sunni 
officers,” was effectively transformed into a “defectors’ hub,” following the same trajectory of large-
scale secession as the Sunni loyalist stronghold of Rastan in Homs.273 The uncontested acquisition of 
significant portions of Deir Ezzor helped facilitate the loss of Aleppo’s countryside, 90% of which, 
according to one rebel commander, fell under his effective control by late May.274 It also facilitated 
the influx of thousands of insurgents into urban Aleppo in July.275 The rebel operation in Aleppo 
captured considerable portions of the eastern part of the city and gave opposition factions a base in 
the country’s industrial capital, which was thereafter partitioned into zones demarcating rebel control 
(east), regime control (west), and YPG control (north).276  
The more the regime retreated from rural areas, where it had overwhelmingly lost Sunni 
support, the more the rebels could surround and penetrate important cities and pressure security forces 
into holding increasingly tenuous positions. This dynamic also led to insurgent advances in several 
urban and suburban settings in western Syria. For example, by May 2012, between 15-20% of the 
city of Homs fell under insurgent control.277 Moreover, in June, Damascus’ suburbs, both north and 
south of the city centre, were the target of a coordinated rebel offensive intended to exert pressure on 
the security elite by attempting to penetrate the capital.278 Pitched battles were heard within 2 km of 
Syria’s parliament, while clashes in the neighbourhood of al-Midan, just 5 km from the presidential 
palace, elicited the deployment of armoured SAA units and snipers in order to neutralize insurgent 
activities.279  
In light of these losses and the growing scope of the insurgency, the regime’s hyperextended 
military accelerated efforts to recede from terrain deemed less strategically vital to the regime’s 
survival in order to reinforce key cities in western Syria, the most important of which was the capital. 
From July to September 2012, the SAA retreated from several areas in the north and northeast in 
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order to focus on Damascus’ periphery.280 The decision to recalibrate strategic focus on key urban 
centres in the western part of the county was also partly shaped by mounting tensions between Syrian 
security forces in the northeast and YPG militias.281 As a result, the regime engaged in a “coordinated 
withdrawal” that tentatively transferred territory to the YPG.282 This enabled the Democratic People’s 
Union (PYD), the Kurdish political party to which the YPG was attached, to operate over large 
territorial swathes of the state with a deepening degree of political and coercive autonomy.283 Though 
the relationship between Damascus and the PYD is complex, the former’s relinquishing of authority 
to a somewhat hostile non-state actor with separatist inclinations was a testament to its coercive 
degeneration and its incapacity to enforce its repressive monopoly across the country.284  
Between July and August, the cohesion of the regime seemed significantly jeopardized. On 
July 6, the Tlass family, long considered Sunni stalwarts of the Assad regime and a key link to Syria’s 
Sunni business community, defected,285 becoming the most prominent family to denounce Assad. 
Following the Tlass family’s defection, the national security headquarters in Damascus was bombed 
on July 18. The bombing targeted a meeting for the central command unit of the regime’s “Crisis 
Management Cell,” an ad hoc security committee tasked with quelling the uprising.286 Four top 
security chiefs were killed in the blast, namely Defence Minister Daoud Rajha, Assistant Vice 
President and Presidential Security Advisor General Hassan Turkmani, National Security Advisor 
Hisham Bekhtiyar, and Deputy Minister of Defence Assef Shawkat.287 Shawkwat, Bashar's brother-
in-law, was one of Syria’s leading intelligence figures tasked with overseeing the committee.288  
Though responsibility for the bombing is disputed, what matters is that important elements of 
the regime – peripheral sections of the military-security elite surrounding Bashar and Maher – had 
begun to disintegrate. With one explosion, up to a third of the command of the Crisis Management 
Cell was liquidated.289 To add to this, the SAA was plagued with personnel shortages. Based on 
calculations made by high-level defectors, Turkish intelligence, and several other sources, an ISW 
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report in the spring of 2012 assessed that roughly 20-30% of the SAA had either defected or 
deserted.290 Moreover, virtually none of the 80,000 conscripts summoned for compulsory military 
service reported for duty throughout the year.291 So depleted was the SAA that it began calling up 
reservists within the first half of the year to replenish its ranks.292 The regime, by most indications, 
was considerably shaken.293 
In addition to the decay of its military command, the regime’s COIN efforts were impeded by 
its reduced mobility along roads targeted by insurgent operations. Since the countryside had become 
an acute site of rebel ambushes, transportation between important battle zones carried with it the risk 
of succumbing to attacks. For example, in late July 2012, over 30% of a 23-vehicle SAA convoy that 
had left Idlib to assist in Aleppo was ambushed and destroyed along the way.294 The M-5 highway 
that links Daraa in the south to Aleppo in the north (the country’s most vital highway and trade 
route)295 was also sporadically targeted, key parts of which fell into rebel hands.296 This meant that 
the SAA was also vulnerable to attacks along key transportation routes. Such operations were aided 
by the capture of terrain immediately situated on the border. By August 2012, a fragmented arc 
running around the Turkish, Lebanese, and Jordanian borderlands had fallen to non-state actors bent 
on either toppling the regime, or in the case of the YPG, establishing autonomous zones outside of its 
jurisdiction.  
As the SAA was disintegrating, insurgent forces were swelling. By mid-2012, an internal US 
intelligence report estimated that over a 1,000 rebel groups had been operating in Syria.297 ISW, 
surveying a composite of sources, estimated that insurgents had grown to number 40,000.298 
Moreover, from 2012-onwards, the SAA was embroiled in fighting, on any given day, in 80-100 
locations nationally.299 Rebel advances appeared to succeed in cornering the security forces, which 
had now largely retreated to western Syria – save for a few scattered pockets across the eastern half 
of the country. Here, the loss of Syrian territory obstructed the regime’s supply lines while also 
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enabling anti-government factions to increasingly establish their own.300 This made it easier for 
insurgents to smuggle weapons and fighters across Syria’s porous borders as they progressively came 
under their control. It also meant that they could territorially penetrate the state from virtually every 
corner. Although foreign sponsorship of rebel groups deepened after late 2012,301 the seeds to Syria’s 
security force decomposition had been planted in the feedback loop set in motion by the regime’s 
coup-proofing apparatus. 
Testing the Limits of a Coup-Proofed Military 
By the end of 2012, the Syrian regime had largely lost control of the state’s security situation, as the 
insurgency seemed to have tested the limits of a coup-proofed military. The territorial advances of 
the rebels across the governorates of Homs, Hama, Idlib, Damascus, Damascus Countryside, Deir 
Ezzor, Raqqa, Daraa, and Aleppo had increasingly obstructed the regime’s supply lines, led to a surge 
in seized bases, and isolated security forces into holding increasingly tenuous positions. Moreover, 
they had encircled and penetrated urban centers. This was aided by their expanding arsenal of 
captured and delivered weapons.  
In addition, the Syrian capital and its nearby weapons stockpiles proved unimmune from rebel 
advances, as demonstrated not only in the latter’s push into suburban neighbourhoods but also in their 
seizure of the Marj al-Sultan Airbase, located a mere 15 km away from Damascus, in late 
November.302 That month, the roads to Damascus International Airport were cut off by the rebels, 
prompting the regime to suspend all international flights.303 Despite its sharp turn to the SAAF as the 
primary mechanism for repression – which in August had begun indiscriminately striking rebellious 
residential neighbourhoods – the SAA was still losing ground. Less than a third of Syrian territory 
was estimated to have remained in the hands of state authorities by the end of the year.304 
By late 2012, the regime also had to increasingly contend with jihadist groups such as Jabhat 
al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria at the time, which were emerging as important players. While 
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the regime preferred the optics of a jihadist opposition over one stacked with moderates, the 
organizational capacity of such groups nevertheless made them a formidable threat militarily. For 
example, from December 2011 to December 2012, al-Nusra claimed responsibility for over 600 
attacks, including 40 suicide bombings that had targeted the mukhabarat and other security forces.305 
Both al-Nusra and other hardline Islamist groups began establishing cells and bases across Syria. 
Additionally, elements of the coercive and political leadership were eroding at an accelerated 
pace.  In another blow to the regime, General Abdulaziz Jasim al-Shallal, head of the military police, 
defected in December, the latest of dozens of generals to do so.306 Together, the defection in the latter 
half of the year of the Tlass family, Prime Minister Riad Hijab, and Foreign Ministry Spokesman 
Jihad Makidissi – alongside multiple other diplomats, officers, and public figures – combined with 
the assassinations of high-level security chiefs and the military gains of the rebels, all “gave the 
impression of a regime on the verge of collapse.”307  
With limited manpower and uncertainty regarding reliability and loyalty, the regime struggled 
to put down a rebellion that for some time seemed to pose an existential threat to the presidency.308 
Its COIN campaign faced a series of significant obstacles. As Emile Hokayem illustrates: 
The regular military, comprising units of differing quality and loyalty, proved 
incapable of conducting joint armoured-infantry operations or coordinating ground-
air operations. It focused on securing static assets and supply routes, but was 
undermined from within by loss of life, desertions and low morale. Concerns about 
defections made the infantry less deployable, forcing the recourse to air power and 
artillery and causing immense human and material damage. The regime's armoured 
capabilities were threatened by anti-tank weaponry seized from bases, and its air 
dominance was challenged by the rebels' capture of military airports and possession 
of anti-aircraft artillery. In many cases, civilian combatants possessed better 
situational knowledge and intelligence than Assad forces.309 
 
The regime needed a supplemental force in order to compensate for its diminished coercive capacity 
– one that could address gaps that resulted from the feedback loop driving the SAA’s attrition, reverse 
the trend of military losses, and ultimately disrupt the momentum of the insurgency. As the SAA 
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crumbled, the regime looked towards mobilizing irregular auxiliaries. Although this process had been 
preliminarily initiated during the first two phases of the conflict (discussed below), in mid-to-late 
2012, the regime, with the help of its allies, began expanding and restructuring PGMs in preparation 
for their formalization – a strategic course it viewed as critical to its survival. In order to resuscitate 
its eroding COIN campaign, it formally diffused coercive authority across PGMs, publicizing its links 
to many of these actors and elevating their status within Syria’s security landscape. This is explored 
below.    
Phase 3 (2013–early 2014): PGMs Formally Emerge, Yet Insecurity Continues to Rise  
PGMs emerged as a robust national and semi-official force in early 2013. Prior to 2013, however, 
there is less agreement regarding the process surrounding the emergence of local popular committees, 
hereafter referred to as PCs, the precursors to PGMs that were formally reconstituted as part of the 
state’s COIN campaign. Though some observers claim that PCs developed as organic defensive 
initiatives sometime between the spring and fall of 2011 due to the vacuum of security caused by 
uprising’s descent into conflict, particularly along sectarian lines,310 others underline the role that the 
mukhabarat played in organizing, arming, and coordinating with these coercive bodies.311  
Whether or not this initially arose as a spontaneous process independent of the security 
apparatus, the incorporation of these structures into the regime’s COIN campaign was a testament to 
its inability to maintain centralized coercive control as its forces disintegrated. The recourse to PCs, 
which were quietly formed in the first phase and expanded across the country in the hundreds 
throughout the second,312 was therefore a direct response to the regime’s failing COIN campaign. As 
auxiliaries, their contribution to localized security and policing in conjunction with the security 
forces313 served the regime’s security effort314 largely by enabling the SAA to reduce its footprint in 
areas where PCs were active.  
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 Regardless of their disputed origins, PGMs underwent a drastic reformulation in mid-to-late 
2012 when the regime’s survival was at stake.315 As demonstrated in the previous section, regime 
insecurity loomed as its growing erosion vis-à-vis an expanding insurgent tide forced it to retract. The 
regime responded by invoking Article 10 of the Syrian constitution’s Military Service Law, which 
permits the use of “other [armed] forces as deemed necessary,” to supplement its security effort.316 It 
also passed legislative Decree 55, enabling the use of irregular – and private – security contractors to 
protect energy facilities.317 A metamorphosis occurred, during which the regime formally 
transformed elements of the PCs and shabiha into semi-official PGMs, the largest of which was the 
NDF. The regime haphazardly initiated this process in 2012 before leveraging the support of the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah to spearhead this restructuring.318 Though 
launched in 2013, the NDF had been “preliminarily active through late 2012, with the IRGC officers 
embedded within individual units.”319 Even prior to the formalization of PGMs, the need for an 
additional force was so great that they unofficially began accompanying the SAA in offensive 
missions to combat the accelerating military advances of the rebels. 
The regime incentivized recruits to join PGMs like the NDF, where fighters were often 
dispatched in assaults on distant battlefields,320 by offering higher salaries relative to the SAA, in 
addition to armaments, licensing, and the ability to count membership towards mandatory military 
service.321 In the months that followed the NDF’s official establishment in January 2013, the 
organization grew to approximately 50,000 with the aim of swelling to 100,000.322 As SAA defenses 
crumbled, the role of indigenous PGMs in the regime’s COIN campaign evolved from localized 
security in conjunction with the intelligence agencies to their growing incorporation in an offensive 
capacity outside of their home regions. 
The official formation of the NDF occurred alongside the formal establishment of a host of 
other indigenous PGMs, ranging from the Ba’ath Brigades to the Syrian Resistance.323 It also 
 
 70 
coincided with the growing mobilization and/or importation of a number of foreign Shia PGMs by 
the IRGC, most of which initially consisted of Iraqi Shia fighters. Prominent Iraqi PGMs that 
deployed fighters to Syria included the Badr Corps, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Kata’ib Hezbollah 
(KH), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), and Liwa Imam Hussein.324 Hadi al-Ameri, the commander of Badr, 
served as Iraq’s minister of transportation and thus facilitated the flow of Iraqi PGMs to Syria.325 
Liwa Abu Fadhl al-Abbas, or LAFA, included both local Syrian residents and foreign Iraqi and 
Lebanese fighters.326  
As the SAA decayed, the regime resorted to splitting the command of its elite mobilizations 
and specialized units to leverage their experience across regular divisions.327 In doing this, it also 
tasked devoted loyalists within the SAA and mukhabarat with forming hybrid civilian-military PGMs 
loosely affiliated with its command. For example, Suheil al-Hassan of the AFID, having proven both 
his loyalty and willingness to kill for the regime, was tasked by the commander of the agency with 
establishing The Tiger Forces, which functioned as a mobile mechanized assault force.328 Domestic 
patrons of the regime such as Rami Makhlouf329 and the loyalist criminal bosses, the Jaber brothers,330 
are often listed as the primary financers of different indigenous PGMs while Iran is believed to finance 
foreign fighters mobilized by the IRGC.331 Though the funding sources of PGM factions vary, what 
matters is that patrons of the regime, in coordination with the security apparatus, consciously 
mobilized to assist it through the formation of irregular forces.  
Following the increased reliance on PGMs, the forces operating within the pro-government 
camp made a number of important strategic advances in the spring of 2013.332 Operations focused on 
holding the line in the capital (and engaging in limited counterassaults in the surrounding areas) while 
restoring control of the country’s western borderlands by securing important terrain throughout Homs 
and Damascus.333 For example, the offensive launched in the spring of 2013 carved a path by clearing 
terrain across the Qalamoun mountains and its adjacent areas that culminated in the reacquisition of 
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the Syrian-Lebanese border town of Qusayr in May. The assault featured 2,000 Hezbollah fighters, 
likely of its elite “special forces,” and marked the first time the Lebanese group led a military assault 
within the conflict.334 The incorporation of PGMs and other exogenous security actors would 
periodically increase as the regime faced strain. 
In spite of recapturing land in western Syria, efforts by the pro-government camp to militarily 
counter the advance of the rebels increasingly manifested in zero-sum terms, as eastern Syria 
overwhelmingly remained outside of its control. The regime lost significant territory in Aleppo and 
Raqqa throughout the winter and spring, coinciding with the deepening expansion of the YPG into 
Kurdish-inhabited areas. By February 2013, the YPG controlled 80% of “Rojava,” a region 
comprising Afrin, Kobane, and Jazeera that features in Kurdish aspirations for statehood.335 The 
transformation of these areas into semi-autonomous cantons effectively signified their territorial 
consolidation under non-state actors that aspired to connect them to form a contiguous land mass 
outside the jurisdiction of Damascus. The YPG then moved to secure complete control of the oil fields 
in the northeast after security forces capitulated in early March.336 
By mid-2013, the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that the SAA had 
shrunk to half its prewar size.337 Moreover, ISW estimated that out of a pre-war SAA figure of 
220,000 career soldiers, the regime was left with 65,000-75,000 loyal “deployable” troops, only 
27,000 of whom were from regular divisions.338 This severely restricted its supply of forces that could 
be dispatched to combat settings. At least 70 high-ranking officers from the SAA and security forces 
had announced their defection through social media, 30 of whom were considered “high profile.”339 
Moreover, the regime’s withdrawals – even when temporary – from a number of bases in rural areas 
led to the loss of large quantities of its arsenal. Throughout 2013, insurgent seizures of the Taftanaz 
Airbase in Saraqeb, the Al-Jarrah Airbase in Aleppo,340 the military complex and arms depot near 
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Khan Touman,341 and the SAA’s 38th Division Air Defense Base in southern Daraa342 led to 
substantial losses in both positions and weaponry. Between Taftanaz, Al-Jarrah, and Khan Touman, 
the SAA ceded roughly 20% of its pre-war stock of helicopters, multiple MiG fighter jets, and large 
inventories of heavy weapons arsenals, rockets, and ammunition.343 In the latter case, these included 
122-mm Grad artillery rockets, 82-mm tank shells, and AT-3 Sagger anti-tank guided missiles.344  
By mid-2013, the regime was also militarily struggling to keep rebel assaults at bay. A much 
more coordinated offensive saw the rebels advance further into suburban Damascus. As Robin 
Yassin-Kassab and Leila al-Shami note: 
By the summer of 2013, better-armed and organised opposition offensives had 
brought the Damascus front line to the edge of the city centre and only five miles 
from the presidential palace. For the regime this represented a greater challenge 
than the brief offensive of the previous summer; besieged in the Ghouta suburbs, 
rebels had nevertheless established and kept a bridgehead as far as Jobar and 
Abbassiyeen Square from which they might launch future strikes on the capital’s 
key installations. Repeated regime offensives had failed to dislodge them.345 
 
Indeed, the suburbs of Qaboun, Douma, Mo’adimaya, Eastern Ghouta, Adra, Barzeh, Jobar, Hajr al-
Aswad, and Yarmouk had all largely fallen to the rebels.346 By late July, despite non-stop regime 
bombardment of these areas, the rebels launched an additional phase of the offensive that drove 
deeper into government-held districts in Jobar, Barzeh, and Qaboun.347 To underline the growing 
threat of the insurgency, by August, amid the context of intensified assaults on pro-government 
positions in Damascus, rebel mortars managed to strike a military convoy carrying the president.348 
Though rebel mortars had in March bombarded central Damascus, placing them within range of 
headquarters belonging to the Ba’ath Party, AFID, and state television,349 they had never jeopardized 
the personal security of the president. Indiscriminate rocket fire, while sporadic, increasingly featured 
as a rebel tactic employed against urban centers like Damascus and Latakia, the former the political 




Table 1– PGM Use in Syria’s COIN Campaign (Phases 1-3) 
Phase  PGM Involvement Role and Function 
1 (Spring to Fall 2011) • Shabiha embedded in regular SAA units 
• Emergence of PCs 
• Shabiha – deniability, 
counterbalance against regular 
Sunni SAA units 
• PCs – Local security/policing in 
coordination with the security 
services, intelligence gathering 
2 (2012-2013) • PCs become widespread 
• Many PCs reorganized into the People’s 
Army and, ultimately, the NDF and various 
sub-factions 
• NDF preliminarily active though not yet 
advertised by state media  
• Foreign (mainly Iraqi) PGMs begin operating 
mainly in Damascus  
• Semi-defensive missions 
• Allow SAA to re-allocate 
personnel to priority fronts  
• Local knowledge 
• Holding forces 
• Filling manpower shortages 
• NDF – limited offensive 
deployments 
• Force augmenters 
3 (2013- winter 2014) • Regime openly advertises its relations to host 
of semi-official PGMs and foreign Iraqi 
factions 
• NDF alone has 60,000 personnel with 
plans to expand to 100,000 
• Foreign PGMs growingly operate outside of 
vicinity of Damascus  
• A mix of offensive and 
defensive operations 
• NDF increasingly deployed in 
counterassaults as infantry and 
in clear and hold capacity 
• Hybrid PGMs – specialized 
operations 
 
By mid-2013, an estimated 65-70% of state territory was now firmly outside the effective 
control of the pro-government camp.350 The coercive forces had failed to retain territory in light of 
their attrition and the growing strength of the rebels. Moreover, defections reached as high as 80% 
among Sunni personnel in the most affected units.351 Thus, the reliance on foreign PGMs, namely 
Iraqi and Lebanese fighters, deepened at this stage of the conflict as personnel shortages increased, 
the rebels seized larger swathes of land, and the regime’s coercive capacity disintegrated.352 Groups 
like LAFA, for example, absorbed larger amounts of foreign fighters, alongside other factions, 
expanding their operations beyond the vicinity of the capital where they were initially active.353 
Similarly, the NDF and other PGMs were rapidly replacing or augmenting SAA divisions on 




Phase Four (Spring 2014 – Winter 2015): a Shifting Balance of Power 
Despite the combat intensive roles undertaken by a patchwork of PGMs and their successes in western 
Syria, from the fall of 2013 until the spring of 2014, the gap between both camps had significantly 
been reduced as insurgent groups swelled. By the spring of 2014, opposition fighters, both moderate 
and Islamist, were estimated to have numbered between 100,000-120,000,355 quantitatively placing 
them on par with the SAA, which is thought to have possessed less than 125,000 troops in its ranks.356 
While one force was growing, the other was substantially shrinking.  
 To make up for SAA shortages and the accelerating shift in the balance of power, the regime 
had relied on as many as 100,000 NDF PGM personnel by this stage of the conflict, reinforced by 
thousands of other PGM recruits outside of the NDF’s structure and anywhere between 3,500-7,000 
Hezbollah fighters.357 General Hussein Hamedani – a senior commander within the IRGC who played 
a vital role in developing Syria’s PGM landscape – claimed in the spring of 2014 that Iran had already 
helped mobilize a domestic Syrian PGM force of at least 70,000 fighters consisting of 42 groups and 
128 battalions.358 In a testimony to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, veteran COIN 
scholar and practitioner David Kicullen asserted that even in the best-case ratio of 2:1 pro-government 
forces to insurgents, the Assad regime – which now nominally held under 25% of Syrian territory – 
fell drastically below the personnel requirements needed to establish a successful COIN campaign.359  
In June 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) launched a sweeping offensive 
across Iraq and Syria, further dislodging the regime’s COIN efforts. After capturing the Iraqi cities 
of Mosul, Bayji, and Tikrit and dissolving the border between Iraq and Syria, ISIS overran Brigade 
93 of the SAA’s 17th Division in Raqqa,360 summarily executing hundreds of SAA detainees.361 It 
then captured the nearby Tabqa Airbase and cemented control of most of Deir Ezzor and practically 
all of Raqqa,362 effectively utilizing its transborder protostate, a 56,000 km land mass,363 to 
reinvigorate its expansion into both countries. By the fall of 2014, ISIS grew to preside over a territory 
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encompassing a third of Iraq and Syria – a landmass roughly the size of Great Britain364 – while 
expanding its ranks to at least 31,500 fighters.365 Moreover, its acquisition of close to half a billion 
dollars from reserves it seized at Mosul’s central bank,366 combined with its control of oil fields in 
eastern Syria and western Iraq – which had enabled it to pump out 50,000 barrels per day – gave the 
group an estimated net worth of $2 billion.367 This resulted in a substantial spike in its ability to self-
finance operations and bankroll recruits. ISIS’ capture of hundreds, possibly thousands, of bullet-
proof US-made Humvees in northern Iraq also significantly strengthened its capacity on the 
battlefield,368 as it enabled the militants to utilize these vehicles to conduct blitzkrieg operations that 
penetrated Syrian and Iraqi defenses through the use of suicide bombings.369 The seemingly limitless 
repository of jihadist ideologues gave the organization’s leadership an army of expendable recruits.  
While ISIS consolidated control over larger swaths of central, eastern, and northern Syria 
alongside the Turkish and Iraqi borders, other factions were entrenched in various positions across 
the country. Syria’s borderlands were now overwhelmingly outside of the territorial grasp of pro-
government forces.  
By the end of 2014, the regime, despite being reinforced by a number of exogenous actors, 
failed to decisively hold ground in the face of mounting pressure from insurgents that were receiving 
much greater support from foreign sponsors. Not only had the SAA suffered significant duress, 
however, the regime faced backlash from a more vocally resentful Alawite community that had grown 
discontented with the status quo.370 This sparked a conscription crisis, as evasion of military service 
soared among Syrians in general and Alawites in particular – a dangerous development for a security 
elite that depended on the latter as its primary source of military manpower throughout the conflict. 
The regime responded by raiding universities and setting up checkpoints across areas it governed in 
search of males to fill its depleted ranks.371 Overall, half a million Syrians were reported to have been 
wanted for conscription by December 2014.372 The SAA’s offensive ground force capacity had 
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depleted to such an extent that, in lieu of its ability to conduct assaults, it had cemented a pattern of 
occasionally bombing military facilities seized by the rebels in order to hinder their ability to operate 
captured military hardware.373 
The regime once again increased its reliance on exogenous security actors as insurgent 
factions captured ground across the country and it was forced to retrench to an even smaller sliver of 
land in western Syria. In order to compensate for personnel shortages, it sharply escalated its 
dependence on PGMs, markedly relying on larger volumes of foreign fighters. This is examined 
below. 
Phase 5 (Spring – Fall 2015): From Insecurity to Near Collapse 
Exogenous security assistance reached unprecedented levels in the spring of 2015. At least 125,000 
PGM fighters and 5,000 Hezbollah operatives were believed to be involved in reinforcing the 
regime’s COIN campaign during the early stages of this phase.374 Moreover, dozens of “locally-
focused” formations multiplied in tandem with PGMs recruits who operated offensively.375 In light 
of its frailty, the regime outsourced operations to such actors while continually dispatching 
detachments of the Republican Guard, 4th Division, and Special Forces to “reinforce priority fronts” 
across the country.376 By February 2015, the regime’s degradation was such that two journalists who 
had recently visited Syria, in an article published by OpenDemocracy, wrote that they had rarely 
encountered any soldiers throughout their entire 12-day dispatch across 1,200 km of regime-held 
territories.377 With the exception of a few “special forces” in Aleppo, the roadblocks they encountered 
were operated by PGMs.378  
Despite an outgrowth of PGMs and other exogenous actors (and in spite of the regime’s 
significant territorial retrenchment), the pro-government camp seemed increasingly incapable of 
launching offensives and retaining ground control. In late March, rebels led by al-Nusra captured the 
strategic city of Idlib in northern Syria.379 Then, in early April, ISIS and al-Nusra had jointly besieged 
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Yarmouk.380 Although the capital was fortified by a bulwark of pro-government forces, the offensive 
nevertheless placed both ISIS and al-Nusra within a few kilometers of the presidential palace. 
Between late April and early May 2015, The Army of Conquest, a new 6,000-strong coalition of 
Islamist rebels,381 captured the strategic town of Jisr al-Shughour.382 The defenses of the SAA’s 88th 
Brigade383 largely collapsed in the wake of the assault, chaotically retreating from their positions.384 
The insurgents continued the offensive and were narrowly prevented from crossing the barrier at the 
Al-Ghab plains in Hama that separated Jisr al-Shughour from the Alawite heartland. Increasingly, 
Latakia, “Assad’s Achilles Heel,” had been militarily exposed.385  
Against this backdrop, ISIS had captured the strategic city of Palmyra in Homs,386 giving it 
“control of a key route to the capital while cutting supply lines to beleaguered Syrian forces farther 
east in Deir al-Zour province.”387 The group’s largely uncontested access to the desert in central Syria 
enabled it to navigate across axes, using Homs as a land bridge to expand into its bordering 
governorates and sustain its own supply lines through Iraqi and Turkish borderlands.388 
On July 25, after months of setbacks in the aftermath of the rebel seizure of Jisr al-Shughour, 
Assad acknowledged in a televised speech that the SAA was facing severe manpower shortages, and, 
owing to these shortages, was forced to withdraw from certain areas to preserve those considered of 
greater strategic value.389 The diminution of military manpower was so widespread that the regime 
even issued an amnesty for deserters.390 Compounding these shortages was the exhaustion not just of 
the regular military, elite forces, and Alawite-dominated PGMs, but of the Alawite community at 
large, which had lost, according to one popular estimate, up to a third of its military-aged men fighting 
on the frontlines.391 Scores of others were rendered unable to fight due to the gravity of their injuries. 
So atrophied was the regime that some observers seriously anticipated either its collapse392 or its 
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permanent retrenchment to a so-called “Alawite state,”393 while others referenced the notion of state 
partition – both as a prescription and a de facto reality.394 
As a result of the sectarianization of the insurgency and growing SAA losses and fatalities, 
conscription evasion at times evolved into outright refusal to enlist and fight on distant battlefields. 
Some Alawite mothers in the mountains adjacent to the coast even reportedly erected roadblocks to 
prevent regime officers from entering and forcibly conscripting their sons.395 In light of the regime’s 
desperation, it acquiesced to the reality underlining conscription resistance by creating PGMs strictly 
mandated to function locally, such as the Coastal Shield Brigades in rural Latakia, thereby permitting 
large amounts of Alawites to fortify positions on their home turf.396 Between July and October, the 
regime established an additional 25 PGM recruitment centres across the Alawite heartland.397 Similar 
defensive PGM arrangements were made with other communities who resisted conscription, such as 
the restive Druze populations in the southern Suweida governorate, some of whom agreed to partner 
with Damascus after the encroachment into their area of hardline insurgent groups.398  
The lack of capable and willing indigenous fighters was exacerbated by the departure of many 
militiamen belonging to Iraqi PGMs who had returned to Iraq to fight ISIS on their soil. To fill the 
void in fighters, Iran expanded its deployment of IRGC personnel to the frontlines in Syria, as did 
Hezbollah – which was already stretched thin – while launching new PGM recruitment drives in 
Iraq399 and escalating efforts to import foreign Shia PGMs from Afghanistan and Pakistan.400 By 
2016, anywhere between 3,500–20,000 Afghan fighters belonging to the Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade 
were estimated to have been on the frontlines in Daraa, Idlib, Aleppo, and Palmyra as a result of the 
IRGC’s expanded recruitment efforts.401 These fighters, who consisted of Hazara refugees residing 
in Iran,402 were utilized specifically as cannon fodder.403 Predominantly dispatched as snipers and 




In the summer of 2015, it looked increasingly likely that the regime would fall. Russia, possibly 
owing to a military assessment provided by Soleimani himself when he visited Moscow that 
summer,405 intervened in late September to rescue the regime from collapse amid fresh rebel gains, 
security force disintegration, and growing PGM fatigue. At the time of its intervention, pro-
government forces, according to a report by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, are believed to 
have controlled under 16% of Syrian territory.406 Moscow’s support, particularly through air strikes, 
helped the pro-government camp triple the territories under its control by mid-2018.407  
At every stage of the conflict, the Assad regime required some form of exogenous security 
assistance to supplement the official institutional infrastructure of the coercive forces. Between 2011 
and 2012, popular committees emerged and expanded, elements of which were then absorbed into 
the NDF and other PGMs that were formally launched in early 2013. PGMs like the NDF were 
growingly tasked with offensive deployments. This occurred alongside the regime’s overt 
collaboration with a range of indigenous and non-indigenous PGMs. Between mid-2013 and early 
2014, Hezbollah was increasingly directing battles, while IRGC advisors devised strategies, Iraqi 
PGMs deployed to the frontlines in greater numbers, and Syrian PGMs growingly replaced the SAA 
in an offensive capacity. By 2015, the IRGC accelerated efforts to import foreign fighters on Assad’s 
behalf, followed by a direct Russian intervention in order to save the regime from collapse. As a result 
Table 2 – PGM Use in Syria’s COIN Campaign (Phases 4 and 5) 
Phase  PGM Incorporation Role/Function 
4 (Spring 2014 – 
Winter 2015) 
• More PGM factions are formed 
• NDF grows to at least 100,00 
• Foreign PGMs deployed across the country 
• PGMs replacing SAA on 
offensive missions 
• Secure/consolidate territory 
• Clear and hold 
5 (Spring 2015 – Fall 
2015)  
• Local PGMs mushroom 
o 25 PGM centres open across the coast 
alone  
• Afghan Fatemiyoun grow in numbers 
• Iraqi fighters recruited in new campaign 
• Assaults 
• Holding a defensive line to 
secure strategic retrenchment  
• Operating checkpoints  
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of a dysfunctional feedback loop, the coup-proofed security forces required external reinforcement at 








































CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION 
This thesis sought to identify the drivers underpinning the employment of PGMs in the post-2011 
Syrian conflict. It set out to provide an analytical framework with which the militiafication of the 
coercive forces could be understood, and, in doing so, attempted to answer the question of why the 
armed and security forces decayed and how this process unfolded. Both the why and the how proved 
interconnected, and, as such, both were devoted a fair amount of attention throughout the study.   
Chapter 2 presented a review of the literature and addressed the utility of PGMs in COIN 
campaigns. It discussed how their employment as covert enforces and their value as force multipliers, 
respectively, enable insecure governments to exercise deniability and fill a void caused by their 
dwindling coercive capabilities, specifically as a result of declining manpower. Moreover, their 
ability to deliver local knowledge can strengthen a state’s COIN operations by providing valuable 
insights on insurgent activity, while the formalization and subsequent co-optation of PGMs alongside 
regular forces creates an aura of legitimacy for governments struggling to repel both armed and 
ideational challenges to their rule. This chapter explored how literature on state weakness and civil-
military affairs have contributed to the scholarly discussion on PGMs and the militiafication of the 
armed forces. The “civil-military problematique” and the “guardian dilemma” were introduced in 
order to develop a theoretical framework that sharpens the relationship between coup-proofing, 
military effectiveness, and the incorporation of PGMs. The theoretical discussion connected the 
argument’s core tenets and delineated how authoritarian rulers often coup-proof their coercive forces 
to resolve the core predicament at the heart of civil-military configurations, yet in doing so, develop 
militaries that perform poorly, and thus, are likely to require exogenous support from PGMs during 
intrastate conflicts.  
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After engaging with the literature to construct a framework regarding the context in which 
these armed actors often emerge, Chapter 3 turned to a discussion of the modality of coup-proofing 
applied by the Syrian president. As the examination of his coup-proofing apparatus demonstrated, 
Assad utilized a mixture of coup-proofing techniques commonly implemented in authoritarian 
regimes in order to structurally divide his coercive forces. Sectarian stacking (underlined by the 
leveraging of familial networks), counterbalancing, and the production of overlapping intelligence 
agencies which monitor the public and one another fomented deeply dysfunctional forces. The 
dependence on elite units that acted largely as praetorian guards and the creation of separate chains 
of command that linked directly back to the ruler limited his coercive machineries’ capacity to 
function autonomously, free from politicization. Together with the enabling of corruption to secure 
the allegiance of the officer corps and the neglect of their rank-and-file personnel, his coup-proofing 
efforts formulated overwhelmingly incompetent forces – save for the elite mobilizations, which were 
more materially and professionally capable. The bulk of his military personnel in particular therefore 
possessed adequacy neither in training nor morale. 
 In Chapter 4, an examination of how the vicious cycle between coup-proofing and regime 
insecurity helped fuel coercive decomposition was explored within the context of the Syrian conflict. 
Building off the framework laid out in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 demonstrated the role that the coup-
proofing tools applied in Syria played in driving the institutional decay of the SAA. In Syria, social 
stratification within the coercive forces largely took on a sectarianized element, with Alawites often 
being afforded greater opportunities relative to their Sunni counterparts. This helped motivate the 
fragmentation of the SAA on a sectarian basis, as most defectors and deserters were demoralized 
Sunni personnel. This also caused the regime to place greater emphasis on trusted units inordinately 
stacked with Alawites, including specialized divisions, which suffered greater attrition because of the 
disproportionate role they were then forced to play. This process was compounded by corruption, 
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which saw Syrian officers engage in a host of illicit practices. All this detrimentally impacted the 
regime’s COIN campaign. From mid-2012 on, regime insecurity periodically soared, followed by the 
formal reliance on PGMs and external military allies, such as Iran, Hezbollah, and ultimately, Russia. 
The latter’s intervention rescued the regime from collapse.  
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH 
The utilization of PGMs in intrastate conflict is a dynamic that has received increased attention over 
the past few decades. Analyzing the role that these actors have played in conflict and post-conflict 
settings and their security relations with the states in which they operate opens itself up to a myriad 
of thematic angles and interpretations. A comprehensive understanding of why these actors come 
about and how they function significantly enhances our understanding of intrastate conflict, 
particularly in weak states governed by authoritarian regimes. 
 An inquiry into PGMs also offers a window into how civil-military affairs may determine the 
response undertaken by authoritarian rulers when faced with challenges to their rule. In this regard, 
the research presented here underlines the importance of developing more refined examinations of 
the link between civil-military affairs and the dynamics of COIN campaigns. While there exists a 
growing body of literature addressing the incentives that drive governments to utilize PGMs during 
wartime, directions for future research on PGMs should consider inquiring into how political 
decisions undertaken by governments prior to the eruption of armed conflict may impact their 
inclination towards leveraging these irregular actors. A closer examination into the political processes 
that lead to the emergence of PGMs is needed. In coup-proofed states, the formulation of 
dysfunctional coercive institutions may help play a role in precipitating the militiafication of the 
armed and security forces, yet the employment of PGMs during wartime is also a demonstration of 
their creativity and adaptiveness.408 Between authoritarian dysfunction and resilience lies a space in 
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